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In this dissertation, I study the economics of the nonprofit sector. In particular, I focus on 
individuals’ motives to contribute to the nonprofit sector either through charitable giving or 
employment within the sector.  
In the first chapter, I ask: how do state lotteries designed to fund education impact overall 
funding available for education? I find that -- while state government net expenditures on 
education do not significantly increase -- charitable donations to education fall. This results in a 
decrease in funding available for education. The large degree of charitable crowd-out observed 
here (relative to other papers in the literature) seems to be driven by how aware donors are of the 
purported beneficiary of the lottery. 
Evidence on whether nonprofit workers earn less than for-profit workers is mixed. In the 
second chapter, I attempt to reconcile mixed results by considering whether we should always 
expect to see wage gaps even when there are workers who are willing to work for less because 
they are motivated by the mission of the nonprofit. I argue that we should only expect wage gaps 
when labor demand of the nonprofit sector of an industry is low. When labor demand is high, 
there are not enough “motivated” workers to fulfill demand and so nonprofits must raise wages. I 
find empirical evidence consistent with these predictions. Penalties for working in a nonprofit are 
largest in areas where nonprofits require a small share of the labor force. In these same locations, 
the quality of work being done and worker job satisfaction are substantially higher than for-
profits. 
In the third chapter, Sera Linardi and I ask: how does visibility impact prosocial 
behavior? We propose that some individuals have “wallflower” preferences and prefer to avoid 
standing out in a negative way (giving much less than average) or a positive way (giving much 
more than average). Wallflowers, therefore, move towards what they expect the average 
individual would choose. As a result visibility may only increase giving when donors expect 
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others’ giving to be high. We conduct a laboratory experiment that supports this prediction. 
“Wallflower” behavior is particularly prominent amongst women. 
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of the third chapter of this dissertation (“The Supply & Demand of Motivated Labor”) motivated 
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patience as I learned from them. Finally, I want to thank my parents, Kate and Taylor Jones, for 
putting me in the position to spend all of my time doing something that I love. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Humans are, perhaps to an economist at least, surprisingly generous and cooperative. This 
generosity can be seen immediately in the context of charitable giving; according to the 2009 
Giving USA report, even in the midst of a recession, more than $300 billion were contributed to 
charitable causes in the United States, accounting for roughly 2% of GDP. Elsewhere, 
individuals appear to be willing to sacrifice wages to work for a nonprofit firm whose mission 
they support.
1
 In countless laboratory experiments in economics and psychology, participants 
have displayed a willingness to simply give away money to other participants, even in a single 
anonymous interaction where there is no opportunity for future reciprocity or reputational gains.  
This dissertation contributes to a line of research that asks: What motivates individuals to 
engage in cooperative behaviors or voluntary action for the public good? From the examples 
above, it seems that individuals do not simply maximize monetary gain, but what else do they 
maximize? An understanding of such motives is not purely a theoretical curiosity, but instead has 
important practical consequences for government, employers, fundraisers, and others. As an 
illustration, consider an individual who makes a donation to a college scholarship fund for 
underprivileged children in her state. Perhaps she made this donation because she is genuinely 
concerned about the educational attainment of these children. Or perhaps she made the donation 
because donating simply makes her feel good, or provides some “warm glow.”2 The full impact 
of government spending on scholarships for underprivileged children depends critically on which 
type of motive is prevalent. If the donor gives because of warm glow, she will continue to give 
when government increases its own spending activities – thereby allowing government to 
                                               
1 There is some disagreement in the literature about whether nonprofit workers actually earn less after controlling 
for worker characteristics. This is addressed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
2 This “warm glow” motive and its implications for giving were first discussed in landmark papers by Jim Andreoni 
(1988, 1989). 
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actually increase funding available for the scholarships. If, on the other hand, the donor is 
concerned about the amount of funding available for scholarships, government spending serves 
as a fine substitute for donations and so she may reduce her donations. This, then, would limit 
the ability of government to impact actual funding available for scholarships. This is just one 
example of how understanding the motives for generosity can make a critical difference in 
understanding the economic impact of practical decisions made by governments or other groups. 
This dissertation studies “doing good” in several settings with the goal of learning about the 
preferences that lead individuals to do good, which in turn will help us understand the broader 
impact of government spending, incentives to work for nonprofits, and incentives to donate to 
nonprofits. 
In the second chapter – much like the example discussed above – I consider the impact 
that the introduction of state lotteries designed to fund education has on overall education 
funding. Because education relies heavily on charitable contributions, it is necessary to consider 
the impact of lotteries on both government education spending and on private donations.  Using 
data on state government budgets, donors, and nonprofit firms, I find that earmarking lottery 
revenues need not increase – and may decrease – education funding. First, government treats 
additional revenue as fungible and directs it to other sources. Second, the announcement of the 
education lottery appears to decrease donors’ willingness to give to education.  
This decrease in willingness to give is surprising because much of the literature on the 
relationship between government activity and charitable donations suggests that donors appear to 
be relatively unresponsive to government activity.
3
 This existing literature could be evidence that 
donors are simply unresponsive to government spending (perhaps because they are motivated by 
warm glow), but it could also be that donors are largely unaware of the type of government 
spending often studied in existing work (e.g., government grants to nonprofits). If the latter is 
true, there remains some uncertainty as to whether donors would respond to government 
spending if they were aware of it. State lotteries are highly salient because the state heavily 
advertises the new source of funding for education. They therefore provide the opportunity to re-
examine whether crowd-out occurs in an environment where donors are aware of government 
activity. I provide evidence that higher awareness of the lottery increases crowd-out: states with 
                                               
3 Or, where there is a drop in giving, the drop can largely be explained by a reduction in fundraiser effort (Andreoni 
& Payne, 2003). 
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higher lottery advertising activities experience larger drops in giving. There are also larger drops 
in giving in states where citizens vote directly on the introduction of an education lottery as 
compared to states where the legislature decides.  In short, the combination of crowd-out and 
fungibility suggest that total funding for education may decrease with the introduction of an 
education lottery. The paper also demonstrates that in this context, when donors are aware of 
government spending, they respond by decreasing their contributions. 
In the third chapter (“The Supply & Demand of Motivated Labor”), I reconsider the well-
known -- but not well-understood -- fact that nonprofit workers earn less on average than for-
profit workers. Existing empirical work leaves open the question of whether this is driven by a 
willingness to work for less (the “labor donation hypothesis”) or instead simply by the 
composition of the nonprofit sector. Wage gaps have been found to be present in some industries 
(e.g., legal services) and absent in other industries (e.g., hospitals). I consider when we should 
expect labor donations to nonprofits to generate wage gaps and, in doing so, offer an explanation 
for the inconsistent results in the existing literature.  
Unlike much of the existing work, I highlight the importance of nonprofits’ labor 
demand. Specifically, it is only in nonprofit employers’ interest to maintain low wages if their 
labor demand does not exceed the number of workers who are willing to work for less. 
Otherwise, nonprofits must raise wages to attract other workers. This yields the prediction that 
wage gaps should be largest when the nonprofit share of labor within an industry is low. As 
nonprofit share increases, wages should equalize. Using economy-wide Census microdata, I 
provide evidence consistent with this prediction. Using more detailed data from the nursing 
home industry which allows me to better control for market conditions and rule out alternative 
explanations, I also find that the quality of work in nonprofit nursing homes is highest in 
localities where the wage gap is largest and the nonprofit share low. Finally, to demonstrate that 
a different “type” of worker sorts into nonprofits when nonprofit share is low, I provide evidence 
that job satisfaction and the likelihood of engaging in charitable giving (outside of work) are 
highest amongst nonprofit worker in low nonprofit share areas. Nonprofits and nonprofit workers 
in higher nonprofit share areas are more similar to for-profits, both with regards to the quality of 
work being done and the workers’ satisfaction and prosocial activities. This provides evidence 
that the relationship between wage gaps and nonprofit share is driven by “motivated types” 
sorting into nonprofit jobs. More broadly, this highlights the importance of intrinsic motivation 
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as a factor in individuals’ job searches – both for workers and for the quality of work that results 
from attracting motivated workers. This suggests that increasing pay is not necessarily the clear 
solution to improve the quality of workers that are attracted to a particular job. 
In the fourth chapter (“Wallflowers”), Sera Linardi and I consider the impact of public 
recognition on giving to charity. Public recognition, of course, is widely used by fundraisers with 
the goal of increasing contributions. Existing theoretical literature suggests that visibility should 
increase giving by providing the opportunity to obtain a positive reputation or forcing would-be 
free-riders to avoid a negative reputation (Benabou & Tirole, 2006). Experimental work has 
largely found this to be the case, but there are some notable exceptions wherein visibility either 
has no impact or decreases contributions. This suggests that individuals may not uniformly seek 
a positive reputation. We propose that some individuals have “wallflower” preferences and avoid 
both negative and positive reputations. To achieve this, wallflowers would choose a contribution 
close to what they expect that the “average” individual would choose. As a result, visibility 
should be expected to have a positive impact if wallflowers believe that others are making large 
donations, but could also have a negative impact if wallflowers believe others give little.  
We test this idea in a laboratory experiment. Participants are placed in groups of three 
and can donate money to a real charitable cause. Participants have the opportunity to indicate 
what donation they would like to choose conditional on every possible combination of group 
members’ contributions. In one treatment (the “Visibility” treatment), contribution decisions and 
identities are revealed within groups. We predict that, if wallflower preferences are prevalent, 
participants will respond to visibility by choosing contributions strictly within the range of group 
members’ contributions. We find evidence in support of this prediction. As a result, visibility 
only has a positive impact when participants believe that the rest of their group has chosen a 
large contribution. We find that this is especially true of women, both in our laboratory 
experiment and in a small-scale field experiment. 
Taken as a whole, these essays highlight the importance – and complexity – of 
individuals’ motives to engage in prosocial behaviors. Policies or actions that would seem to 
increase public good provision (lotteries, higher wages for nonprofit workers, public recognition 
in fundraising) are ultimately shown to have substantially more nuanced effects after accounting 
for individuals’ motivations.  
 5 
2.0  EDUCATION’S GAMBLING PROBLEM: THE IMPACT OF EARMARKING 
LOTTERY REVENUES FOR EDUCATION ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND 
CHARITABLE GIVING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, state governments have come to embrace lotteries as an 
alternative source of revenue. Lotteries have proven to be successful in this regard; on average, 
lotteries add nearly 500 million dollars to states’ budgets yearly.4 While a handful of states add 
lottery revenue to their general funds, states typically earmark the revenue to support particular 
public goods. States adopt lotteries with the intention of funding causes as diverse as 
environmental protection, the arts, and support for their elderly, but most commonly lottery 
funds are earmarked for education. Twenty of the forty-three states that currently sponsor 
lotteries direct all of their revenues towards education, while several more dedicate at least some 
fraction to education. However, some existing research suggests that the purported beneficiaries 
of state lotteries rarely experience a significant increase in state government expenditures (Borg 
et al., 1991; Erekson et al., 2002; Spindler, 1995)
5
.  
Even if earmarked lottery revenues do not increase government’s contribution to the 
intended public good, government is of course not the only source of funding for many public 
goods. In most cases, the causes supported by state lotteries also benefit from and rely on 
charitable contributions. This is especially true of education. In aggregate, education-related 
organizations consistently receive more donations than any other secular cause in the United 
                                               
4 Based on the 2008 Survey of Government Finances 
5 This literature is discussed in more detail in section 2.3. 
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States. Americans donated a total of 38.87 billion dollars towards education in 2011, which is 
roughly twice the amount of money that was raised through state lotteries in the same year.
6
 An 
examination of government expenditures alone therefore does not capture the full impact that a 
lottery has on public good provision, as the lottery may also affect charitable contributions. 
With this in mind, I examine the impact of the introduction of education lotteries on 
overall education funding, considering both government expenditures and – as the main focus of 
the paper – private donations. Standard models of public good provision suggest that if 
individuals’ utilities depend at least in part on the overall level of the public good, then 
government spending serves as a substitute for charitable contributions (Andreoni, 1989; 
Bergstrom et al., 1986). Thus, we should expect charitable contributions to decrease with an 
increase in government spending. Numerous empirical tests have generally found this to be the 
case, though in many cases the degree of crowd out is relatively small.
7
 If donors respond to the 
announced increase in government funding associated with the introduction of a lottery, then this 
– combined with the fungibility of lottery revenue – may imply that lotteries lead to a decrease 
in total provision.  
I assess the degree to which lottery revenue impacts donors’ contributions using three 
individual-level surveys: Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS), Giving and 
Volunteering Survey (GVS), and Consumer Expenditures Survey (CES). Collectively, these 
surveys span from 1989 to 2008, so all of the analysis in the paper focuses on this time period. 
All of these surveys ask respondents to indicate how much money they have donated recently to 
a variety of causes, including education. In a difference-in-differences framework I compare the 
level of education-related donations before and after a state has introduced an education-funding 
lottery. I find a significant decrease in education giving when an education lottery is introduced.  
I then address why contributions fall in this context and speak to a more general question 
in the literature on donors’ response to government activity. Andreoni and Payne (2003), 
Andreoni and Payne (2011) show that the negative relationship between charitable contributions 
and government grants to nonprofits can in some cases almost entirely be explained by a 
decrease in fundraiser effort. Their results might suggest that donation decisions are in fact 
relatively unresponsive to the overall level of the public good. In this paper, I explore a different 
                                               
6 Giving USA, 2012 
7 See Vesterlund (2006) for a review of the empirical crowd-out literature. 
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explanation for their result and for the small degree of crowd-out that is often observed in the 
literature: donors may be largely unaware of government activity in most settings. While this 
theoretical possibility has been discussed in the literature,
8
 to my knowledge this is the first paper 
to empirically assess the importance of the salience of government spending. 
Unlike government spending in the form of grants to nonprofits, the intended increase in 
spending associated with the introduction of a lottery is highly publicized and the beneficiary is 
well known. States are eager to advertise that revenues go towards a “good cause,” perhaps to 
overcome moral opposition to the lottery and draw in customers who might not otherwise 
gamble (Clotfelter & Cook, 1990); advertisements therefore typically include some reminder of 
the cause supported by lottery revenues (Clotfelter & Cook, 1991). Thus, state lotteries provide 
the opportunity to test whether donors (and not just fundraisers) respond to government activity 
in a setting where government spending is highly salient. 
To determine whether donors or nonprofits drive crowd-out, I analyze the tax returns of a 
random sample of nonprofits in the same difference-in-differences framework. I find that an 
education lottery decreases donations received by education-related organizations by roughly 
8%. This is not driven by a change in fundraising behavior. Moreover, there is a negative 
relationship between donations received and a proxy for a state’s lottery advertising 
expenditures. This suggests that donors’ response to (the perception of) increased spending is 
dependent on the salience of government activity.  
A few empirical studies have examined the interaction of lottery expenditures and 
charitable giving; however, these studies primarily examine the general charitable activities of 
lottery players. In cross-sectional data, (Borg et al., 1991) report a negative relationship between 
charitable giving and lottery expenditures; they then provide some evidence that suggests that 
lottery players would have been contributing less even in the absence of a lottery. Lin and Wu 
(2007) find a positive relationship between charitable giving and government-sponsored lottery 
expenditures in Taiwan, where lottery revenues are used to support a variety of public goods.
9
 
However, in a follow-up paper also based on the Taiwanese lottery, Wu (2012) more fully 
                                               
8 In particular, both Garrett and Rhine (2010) and Monti (2010) point to higher awareness of government activity as 
a potentially important difference between direct government spending and spending through government grants. 
Monti presents a model demonstrating the impact that increased awareness may have on donations. 
9 Devlin (2004) show that there is a positive relationship between charitable donations and participation in smaller 
scale charity-sponsored lottery fundraisers. 
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accounts for selection bias and shows that there is in fact little relationship between the amount 
that lottery players spend on the lottery and the amount that they donate to charity. However, the 
question of whether the introduction of a lottery impacts charitable contributions more generally 
– and not just at the level of individuals who choose to play the lottery – has been neglected. 10  
By focusing on the charitable expenditures of lottery players, these existing results can not speak 
to the potential for more general crowding-out of donations.  
A related theoretical and experimental literature examines the use of lotteries and raffles 
as substitutes for relying on voluntary contributions. This literature suggests that a fixed-prize 
lottery can lead to higher public good provision than voluntary contributions (Lange et al., 2007; 
Morgan, 2000; Morgan & Sefton, 2000). However, these results do not hold for lotteries where 
the prize is a function of the number of tickets sold (pari-mutuel lotteries). State lotteries include 
both fixed prize and pari-mutuel components, so I do not claim to speak directly to this 
theoretical literature here. However, Morgan’s model does highlight the idea that donors might 
view the lottery as an alternative method of contributing to education. If this is the case, a 
decrease in giving is not necessarily indicative of a decrease in private support for education. I 
consider this possibility empirically in a later section of this chapter.  
The decrease in charitable support for education reported here exacerbates the 
redistributive concerns associated with lotteries, which are already known to be a highly 
regressive (albeit voluntary) tax (Grote and Matheson, 2011). In the United States, there is a 
significantly negative relationship both between (1) income and lottery expenditures (as a 
fraction of income) and (2) education and lottery expenditures (Clotfelter & Cook, 1991). 
Charitable giving, on the other hand, shows just the opposite patterns: (1) giving (as a fraction of 
income) increases with income for most of the range of incomes and (2) giving significantly 
increases with education (Andreoni, 2006). Thus, lotteries may decrease overall public good 
provision and shift the burden of financing a public good from high- to low-income individuals. 
While researchers have examined a variety of issues related to state lotteries, the general 
impact of state lotteries as a means to finance public goods is not well understood. This paper 
fills this gap by examining not just government activity but also the impact of lotteries on 
                                               
10 One very recent exception is Andreoni, Payne, and Smith’s (2013) analysis of donations received by charitable 
organizations selected to receive funds from the UK National Lottery. They find that, for small organizations, 
receiving lottery funds actually increases the donations an organization receives. This result is discussed in greater 
detail in my concluding remarks. 
 9 
charitable expenditures. In doing so, the results also contribute to the more general literature on 
the interaction of government activity and charitable giving. Recent work in this area has 
generally found that crowd-out is largely explained by fundraiser behavior. The results presented 
here point to the importance of salience of government activity; when donors are more aware of 
government activity, their behavior is more in line with the crowd-out predicted by classic 
models of voluntary contributions to public goods. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In 2.2, I provide some additional 
background on education-funding lotteries and charitable donations to education. In section 2.3, I 
discuss the general empirical strategy used throughout. In section 2.4, I analyze state government 
finance data; this is done both to test the robustness of existing fungibility results in the time 
period studied here and also as a means of introducing the lottery “treatment.” I then turn to the 
main focus of the paper: I first examine the impact of the introduction of an education lottery on 
individuals’ education contributions (section 2.5) and then on education-related nonprofit firms’ 
finances (section 2.6). Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND ON STATE LOTTERIES AND CHARITABLE 
SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION 
Before proceeding to the analysis, some additional detail on state lottery and charitable support 
for education will help fix ideas. In particular, the degree to which we might expect donors to 
reduce their contributions depends in part on their perception of the overlap between the causes 
they support and the specific causes supported by the lottery. Thus, despite the fact that most of 
the analysis will center on the impact of lotteries on education spending and giving in general (in 
part because I am unable to decompose education giving any further in the donor-level data), 
here I discuss which particular causes within education tend to benefit from each source of 
funding. 
As noted, education is typically the most popular secular category of giving in the United 
States, second only to religious giving. In 2011, 38.87 billion dollars and 13% of all charitable 
donations went to education-related causes. This figure – and the “education giving” discussed 
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throughout – includes donations to a wide array of education-related organizations: “giving to 
the education subsector includes giving to support nonprofit, public, and charter, pre-K through 
grade 12 schools; non-profit and public colleges and universities; vocational and technical 
schools; nonprofit and public libraries; education research and policy; adult education 
programs; tutoring programs; and student services organizations.”11 However, a majority of 
donations to education (roughly 78% in 2011) support public and private higher education 
(including scholarship and financial aid programs). There is a fairly even split between support 
for public and private institutions: in 2011, private institutions received 55% of donations to 
higher education, while public institutions received 45% of donations.
12
  
So while a broad array of causes fall under the umbrella of “support for education,” the 
main beneficiaries are public and private institutions of higher education. We will see that this is 
generally true of education lotteries introduced during the sample period as well. In the 
difference-in-differences framework employed in this paper, the impact of an education lottery is 
identified by changes that occur in states that introduce a lottery at some point during the sample 
period. The main donor-level data I use spans from 1989 to 2008 so I focus on this time period 
throughout. The states that introduced education lotteries during these years and the specific 
causes that they currently support are listed in Table 2.1.
13
 Like private charitable support for 
education, a majority of these lotteries are currently designed – at least in part – to fund higher 
education. Many of these lotteries were accompanied by the introduction of large-scale, state-
run, lottery-funded scholarship programs.
14
 Many of the lottery programs also support programs 
outside of higher education that often fall within the private nonprofit sector, such as literacy 
programs and pre-kindergarten programs for low-income children.  
 
 
 
                                               
11 Source: Giving USA 2012 report 
12 Source: Council for Aid to Education Annual Survey (2012) 
13 A comprehensive historical listing of specific beneficiaries is not available. All lotteries listed have supported 
some education-related cause(s) since the date indicated. Some states (like South Carolina) adjust the specific 
composition of their beneficiaries on a year-to-year basis. 
14 Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship is a prominent example and seems to have served as a model for several states that 
followed. 
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Table 2.1. Education lotteries introduced during sample period 
State 
Education lottery 
established 
Specific beneficiary** 
Georgia 1993 
Higher ed. scholarships (public & private schools), 
funding for pre-K programs 
Missouri 1993* Programs at all levels of public education 
New Mexico 1996 
Higher ed. scholarships (public universities / 
community colleges) 
Texas 1997* Public K-12 
Vermont 1998* “Education fund” 
Virginia 2000* Public K-12 
Washington 2001* 
Higher ed. scholarships/fin. aid (public & private 
schools), low-income pre-K programs 
South Carolina 2002 
All levels of education, scholarships/fin. aid  for 
public & private universities 
Tennessee 2004 
Higher ed. scholarships (public & private), pre-K and 
after-school programs 
Kentucky 2005* 
Higher ed. scholarships (public & private), early 
childhood literacy programs 
Oklahoma 2005 
Public K-12, Higher ed. grants / loans / scholarships, 
Other higher ed. programs 
North Carolina 2006 
Public K-12, Higher ed. scholarships / financial aid, 
and pre-K programs 
* These states already had a lottery (with revenues going towards a different cause or a general 
fund) but switched to earmarking funds only for education in the year indicated.  
** Information on specific beneficiaries is obtained from state lottery websites and is current as 
of early 2013. 
 
2.3 GENERAL EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Throughout the paper, I employ a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to identify the 
impact of an education lottery on government finances (Section 2.3), donors’ contributions 
(Section 2.4), and donations received by nonprofits (Section 2.5). The generic empirical 
specification employed throughout is: 
 
                                            
     
 
 12 
where yist is the outcome variable of interest and Xist is a vector of individual-level covariates. 
More importantly, “edulotist” is an indicator variable equal to one if observation i is in a state (s) 
that, at that point in time (t), sponsors an education-funding lottery.
15
 Throughout, standard 
errors are adjusted to allow for clustering at the state-level. As noted in the previous section, the 
identification of an effect of introducing an education lottery stems from changes that occurred 
within the twelve states listed in Table 2.1.  
There is some unavoidable imprecision in defining when the education lottery 
“treatment” begins in some cases. It is unclear, for instance, whether we should expect a lottery 
introduced in November of 2005 to generate observable changes in donations or government 
spending during the entire 2005 calendar year. Thus, a lottery that is introduced in the second 
half of the year (after June 30) is coded as beginning in the following year. Similarly, data from 
nonprofit tax returns and government finances are reported by fiscal year rather than calendar 
year. Thus, data from states or nonprofits with fiscal years ending in the first half of the calendar 
year (prior to June 30) is interpreted as data from the preceding year, which is the year during 
which the majority of the relevant activity took place. 
One potential concern with the difference-in-differences approach is that states may 
introduce education lotteries in response to a decrease in the availability of education funding 
from either private or public sources. This would violate the assumption of parallel pre-treatment 
trends across treatment and control states. However, factors that are unrelated to education 
financing (e.g., within-state religiosity, the adoption of a lottery in a neighboring state) have been 
shown to be more important predictors of lottery adoption than fiscal crises (Coughlin et al., 
2006), particularly in lotteries introduced after the 1970s (Alm et al., 1993). Additionally, in the 
next section I offer evidence that lottery states do not experience drops in revenue or increases in 
education expenditures in the years preceding to the adoption of a lottery. 
 
                                               
15 An “education-funding lottery” is defined here as a lottery that is introduced solely for the purpose of funding 
education. Some states defined here as education lotteries use a small fraction of their revenues for other causes, but 
only after achieving a certain threshold of funding for education. Thus, more precisely, an education lottery is 
defined here as a lottery for which the entire first dollar of revenue is earmarked for education. 
 13 
2.4 STATE LOTTERIES & GOVERNMENT FINANCES 
In this section, I examine the impact of the introduction of an education-funding lottery on state 
expenditures and revenues. The main focus of the paper is the analysis of charitable donations 
(Sections 2.5 and 2.6). This section is included both as an introduction to the lottery “treatment” 
(as it is implemented by government) and to allow for considerations of the impact of a lottery 
on overall education funding, accounting for both charitable donations and government 
spending. 
2.4.1 Existing literature on fungibility of earmarked lottery revenue 
If education lotteries crowd out charitable donations to education without an accompanying 
increase in state expenditures, then the true impact of an education lottery is a reduction in 
overall education funding. As noted, a handful of studies have examined the extent to which 
earmarked lottery revenue increases government expenditures for the intended beneficiary. 
While all of the papers in this literature find at least some evidence of fungibility, the degree of 
fungibility varies widely across studies.  
Novarro (2005) and Evans and Zhang (2007) find that, conditional on sponsoring a 
lottery, an additional dollar of lottery proceeds intended for education does increase K-12 
education expenditure, but by significantly less than a dollar. For instance, Evans & Zhang 
estimate that a dollar of lottery proceeds generates $0.50-$0.70 of education spending.  Garrett 
(2001), Spindler (1995) find that earmarked lottery spending is completely offset by decreases in 
spending from other revenue sources so that total spending does not change. Borg et al. (1991), 
Erekson et al. (2002) find that earmarking lottery revenues actually decreases total spending on 
education.  
However, some of these studies either compare state expenditures for just one state (or a 
handful of states) before and after a lottery (Garrett, 2001; Spindler, 1995) or, alternatively, for 
all 50 states but within just one year in a cross-section (Borg et al., 1991; Erekson et al., 2002). It 
is difficult to determine whether the effect (or lack of effect) of the lottery is causal. Novarro 
(2005) and Evans & Zhang (2007) are exceptions to this as they construct panels of all fifty 
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states and employ state fixed effects; however, both focus is on dollar-for-dollar changes in 
spending conditional on sponsoring a lottery rather than the total average change in spending 
after the introduction of a lottery. Some of Novarro’s results at least seem to suggest that there is 
little overall change in spending. More importantly, both Novarro (2005) and Evans & Zhang 
(2007) study a different outcome variable (elementary education spending) and an earlier time 
period (1976-2000) than the present research. Thus, before proceeding to the analysis of 
charitable contributions, I begin by assessing the impact of education lotteries on government 
finances in a panel of all 50 states during the time period studied in the remainder of the paper 
(1989-2008).      
2.4.2 Data and empirical approach 
I use data from the Census Bureau’s Survey of Government Finances. The Survey provides a 
yearly account of states’ expenditures and revenues, broken into detailed categories. From this 
data, I construct a panel of all fifty states from 1989 through 2008 where each observation 
represents a particular state-year combination. I follow the difference-in-differences framework 
discussed in Section 2.3 and estimate fixed-effects regressions, with fixed-effects at the state 
level. The dummy variable “Edulot,” indicating that the state operates an education-funding 
lottery, is of primary interest. I examine the impact of being treated on several revenue and 
expenditure measures; all outcome variables are in logs and measured at a per capita level. All 
specifications in this subsection include controls for available time-varying state-level variables 
that may impact state revenues and expenditures: log of population, log of per capita income, a 
dummy for the presence of a non-education lottery, and (when revenue is not an outcome 
variable) log of non-lottery revenue. 
2.4.3 Results 
The impact of an education lottery is reported in Table 2.2, with each column taking a different 
measure of revenue (columns 1-3) or expenditure (columns 4 & 5) as the dependent variable. 
Education lotteries are successful in increasing state revenue: overall revenue increases by 
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roughly 3% with the introduction of a state lottery (column 1); non-tax revenue (which still 
includes lottery revenue) increases by 7% (column 2). One might be concerned that states 
introduce new taxes in the same year that they introduce a lottery as part of a broader funding 
initiative; this would be problematic for our interpretation of the cause of crowded-out charitable 
contributions in future sections. However, we see in column 3 that this is not the case. 
We now turn to the impact of lotteries on expenditure. Most importantly, we see that the 
introduction of an education lottery does not significantly increase education spending (column 
4). The introduction of an education lottery is associated with an increase in non-education 
related spending (column 5). Non-education spending is defined here as total spending minus 
education related spending. The model predicts that non-education spending increases by 5.6%.
16
  
   
Table 2.2. DID Estimates of state revenue and expenditure response to education lottery (FE-Reg.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Revenue Non-tax 
revenue 
Tax revenue Education 
expenditure 
Non-education 
expenditure 
      
Edulot 0.0302* 0.0692** -0.0235 -0.00932 0.0561** 
 (0.0159) (0.0265) (0.0251) (0.0312) (0.0230) 
Population -0.402*** -0.426*** -0.359*** -0.214** -0.179 
 (0.0714) (0.156) (0.0985) (0.106) (0.191) 
Income per 
capita 
0.975*** 0.657*** 1.514*** 0.581** 0.493*** 
 (0.192) (0.241) (0.304) (0.226) (0.166) 
Non-educ. lot. -0.00509 0.0210 -0.0393 -0.0460 0.0292 
 (0.0236) (0.0325) (0.0371) (0.0412) (0.0259) 
Other revenue    0.224*** 0.258*** 
    (0.0759) (0.0598) 
Constant 4.174*** 11.71*** 1.236 1.077 1.449 
 (1.311) (2.489) (1.774) (1.744) (2.875) 
      
State FE’s X X X X X 
Year FE’s X X X X X 
      
Observations 950 950 950 950 950 
R-squared 0.962 0.936 0.934 0.953 0.978 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-level) in parentheses. 
All continous controls and outcome variables are in logs and measured at the per-capita level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                               
16 The main results from Table 2.2 are robust to the inclusion of additional time-varying controls and the inclusion 
of pre-treatment and post-treatment trends. See Appendix Table A1. 
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Relative to the existing literature, these empirical specifications are closest to those of 
Novarro (2005) and Evans & Zhang (2007), in the sense that they assess the impact of 
earmarking in a panel with state fixed effects. Both of their papers find that, while there is 
evidence of fungibility, there is some positive relationship between lottery revenue and education 
spending. Thus, while charitable donations are the main focus of this paper, the fact that I 
observe no increase in government education expenditure warrants a brief comment. First, both 
of their papers take elementary (K-12) education expenditures as the dependent variable and 
focus on an earlier time period (1976-2000). If I restrict my analysis to elementary education 
spending and shift my analysis to the years they cover (reported in Appendix Table A2), I too 
find a positive impact of an education lottery. However, this still fails to generate a significant 
increase in overall education expenditures. Thus, the extreme fungibility observed here may be a 
more recent phenomenon. 
 
Table 2.3. State expenditure response to education lottery -- other expenditure categories (FE-Reg.) 
Expenditure 
category 
Mean per capita 
spending  
(2008 dollars) 
Treatment effect 
(Edulot) 
Expenditure 
category 
Mean per capita 
spending  
(2008 dollars) 
Treatment effect 
(Edulot) 
Elem. educ. $905.76 -0.0574 Public safety $187.76 -0.00468 
 (302.33) (0.0578)  (73.81) (0.0560) 
Higher educ. $607.94 0.0208 Health $177.23 -0.0312 
 (168.52) (0.0355)  (86.14) (0.0695) 
Public welfare $1077.62 0.0715 Hospitals $152.37 0.0741 
 (387.78) (0.0508)  (97.84) (0.158) 
Govt. salaries $864.53 0.0122 Interest on debt $174.51 0.0661 
 (451.90) (0.0402)  (142.83) (0.100) 
Insurance trust $527.19 0.130** Utilities $38.12 -0.380 
 (245.12) (0.0626)  (93.71) (0.227) 
Highways $418.10 -0.00516 Financial admin. $83.73 0.227* 
 (206.58) (0.0452)  (50.00) (0.120) 
 
What non-education expenditure areas are benefitting from lottery revenue? In Table 2.3, 
the empirical specification employed in Model 4 of Table 2.2 is repeated but with the top ten 
(non-education) expenditure categories as dependent variables. I also report the predicted impact 
of the lottery on higher and K-12 education expenditures separately. The introduction of an 
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education lottery has the most impact on insurance trust expenditures
17
 and financial 
administration
18
, both of which significantly increase by more than 10%.  
In Table 2.4, I assess the parallel trends assumption necessary for the difference-in-
differences approach and also examine changes in revenue and education expenditure over time 
more generally. I regress expenditures and revenues on a dummy indicating that an education 
lottery is in place (“Edulot”), but I also include a dummy set to one 2 years prior to the 
introduction of a lottery (“Edulot – 2 years”) and a dummy set to one 2 years after a lottery 
(“Edulot + 2 years”). Included (but not displayed) are the same controls included in preceding 
specifications (population, income per capita, presence of a non-education lottery, state fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and – in Models 3-5 only – non-lottery revenue.) 
The variable “Edulot – 2 years” is included to test whether there is a change in 
government revenue or education expenditures in the years leading up to the adoption of a 
lottery, which – as noted in the previous section – might impact our interpretation of the 
“treatment effect” associated with the introduction of a lottery, both here and in the remainder of 
the paper. However, we see that there is no significant difference between soon-to-be-treated and 
untreated states with respect to revenue (Models 1-2), education expenditures (Model 3), or 
either of the non-education expenditure categories that appear to benefit most from education 
lotteries (Models 4-5). 
It is possible that it takes time for lottery revenues to be funneled into education 
spending. If this were the explanation for the absence of an increase in education expenditures, 
we would expect a significant and positive coefficient on “Edulot + 2 years.” This is not 
observed (Model 3).  
Of course, a related concern – particularly given the focus on donations in this paper – is 
that a lottery is introduced because private support for education (donations) is falling. However, 
using an empirical specification and data that will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.6, this 
                                               
17 Defined by the Census Bureau as “Cash payments to beneficiaries (including withdrawals of retirement 
contributions) of employee retirement, unemployment compensation, workers’ compensation, and disability benefit 
social insurance programs.” Though not displayed here, I can demonstrate that this result is not entirely driven by 
employees’ retirements – which would include teacher pensions.  
18 Defined by the Census Bureau as “Activities involving finance and taxation. Includes central agencies for 
accounting, auditing, and budgeting; the supervision of local government finances; tax administration; collection, 
custody, and disbursement of funds; administration of employee- retirement systems; debt and investment 
administration; and the like.” 
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does not appear to be the case (Appendix Table A3). There are no observable differences in 
donations to education across treated and untreated states two years prior to treatment. 
 
Table 2.4. Robustness test - State revenue and expenditure response to education lotteries in years preceding and 
following treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Revenue Non-tax 
revenue 
Education 
expenditure 
Insurance trust 
expenditure 
Financial 
admin. 
expenditure 
      
Edulot – 2 years -0.00811 -0.00293 -0.0139 0.0136 0.0108 
 (0.0268) (0.0424) (0.0195) (0.0388) (0.0892) 
Edulot 0.0245 0.0519* -0.00265 0.0714 0.251*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0282) (0.0170) (0.0484) (0.0645) 
Edulot + 2 years 0.0198 0.0331 0.00623 0.0825* -0.0546 
 (0.0176) (0.0206) (0.0154) (0.0481) (0.0831) 
      
Observations 950 950 950 950 950 
R-squared 0.962 0.937 0.953 0.931 0.881 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-level) in parentheses. 
All outcome variables are in logs and measured at the per-capita level.  
Specifications include additional controls included (but not displayed) as noted in the text. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To summarize, education lotteries significantly increase revenue but fail to significantly 
increase education expenditures for education lotteries introduced between 1989 and 2008. This 
is consistent with most of the existing literature on the fungibility of earmarked lottery revenues. 
Thus, overall funding available for education hinges on the impact of an education lottery on 
private donations to education-related causes, which we examine next. 
2.5 DONOR RESPONSE TO LOTTERIES 
2.5.1 Data and empirical approach 
How do donors respond to the introduction of an education lottery? To begin to answer this 
question, I analyze responses from three individual-level surveys:  the Giving and Volunteering 
in the United States Survey (GVS), the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS), and the 
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Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). All three of these surveys ask respondents to indicate how 
much they have donated to a variety of causes, including education.  
GVS and COPPS were designed to gather information about individuals’ charitable 
activities and are two of the most widely used sources of data on the topic. Both surveys ask 
detailed questions about the amount donated to various charitable causes such as education, 
health, public services, etc., in addition to more basic demographic information. COPPS follows 
a panel of individuals between 2001 and 2009 (with surveys every two years). GVS is not a 
panel, but I have constructed a repeated cross-section of surveys between 1990 and 1999 (again, 
with waves every two years – until 1996, when the next wave was not administered until 1999). 
In both surveys, participants are asked about their charitable giving in the preceding calendar 
year, so collectively GVS and COPPS provide results for the years 1989 through 2008.  
The COPPS data is preferable as it is a panel and allows for individual fixed effects, 
thereby controlling for unobserved differences in altruism. However, given that identification in 
the difference-in-differences framework stems from a state establishing an education lottery 
within 2001 to 2009, one might be concerned that the results are driven by something specific 
about this handful of states. Thus, the GVS data is included to further support the robustness of 
the results by providing additional observations during a different decade with different states 
introducing education lotteries.  
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) – which follows respondents for four quarters 
and rotates in a new wave of respondents each quarter – is of course not primarily designed to 
address charitable giving. However, the survey does ask respondents to indicate how much they 
give to charitable organizations (which they define as organizations “such as United Way, Red 
Cross, etc.”), religious organizations, political organizations, and education organizations.  
Moreover, since 2001 the survey has asked respondents to indicate how much they spend on 
“Lotteries and games of chance.” Neither GVS nor COPPS ask participants to indicate their 
lottery expenditures. Thus, CES (from 2001-2008) is used here to examine how the introduction 
of a lottery differentially impacts individuals who do and do not play the lottery. Because CES is 
a quarterly dataset, respondents are considered “treated” if there is an education lottery in their 
state in the quarter (as opposed to year) of response. 
CES indicates respondents’ state of residence. However, a drawback of the CES is that if 
there are too few respondents from a particular state, then it is not possible to identify state of 
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residence for anyone from that state.  Thus, while six states introduce an education lottery during 
the time period covered by CES, there are only observations from four of these states. Because of 
this, CES is primarily used to test the relationship between charitable expenditures and lottery 
expenditures.  
The primary outcome variable of interest in all three datasets is total giving to education. 
In both COPPS and GVS, respondents report education giving for the preceding calendar year. In 
CES, respondents report education giving for the preceding quarter. In all three datasets, a 
handful of exceedingly high donations are removed; given the relatively low number of 
individuals who make positive contributions, a few contributions may wield excessive influence 
over the estimated mean impact of treatment.
19
 To apply a consistent rule across all three 
datasets, observations with contributions above the 99
th
 percentile of education contributions 
(conditional on making a positive education) contribution are removed. This amounts to 55 of 
the total 221,067 observations in CES, 52 of the 39,795 observations in COPPS, and 15 of the 
12,133 observations in GVS. This allows me to estimate the impact of an education lottery on the 
“typical” donor; Section 2.6 – where I analyze data from nonprofit tax returns – provides the 
opportunity to assess the impact of the lottery on contributions at a more aggregate level. 
Included covariates vary by the survey and empirical approach being used. In the COPPS 
data, all specifications control for family income. When the COPPS data is estimated without 
individual fixed-effects, I also include a variety of additional controls: number of children, 
employment (respondent and spouse), marital status, urban-rural residence status, age, sex, and 
race. GVS specifications include controls for race, gender, employment (respondent and spouse), 
church attendance, age, education level, income, marital status, children in household, and 
confidence in education (as indicated in the survey). Finally, in analyzing the CES data, I control 
for education level, total consumption expenditures, education level, age, sex, and race. 
Regardless of the survey being used, all specifications include year fixed effects and state fixed 
effects (unless the specification includes individual-level fixed effects.)  
                                               
19 For instance, in the GVS data, the inclusion of these extreme observations leads to estimates that suggest that the 
average drop in giving associated with an education lottery is larger than the initial mean of giving.   
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2.5.2 Results 
Results from the baseline specifications in both datasets are presented in Table 2.5. Column 1 
reports the results of a fixed-effects regression in the COPPS data; column 2 reports the results of 
the repeated cross-section analysis in the GVS data. In either case, we find that education giving 
significantly decreases when an education lottery is introduced. To provide some sense of the 
magnitude of these coefficients, the mean of education giving is roughly $40 in both datasets.  
 
Table 2.5. Baseline results - Impact of education lottery on education giving 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Educ. giving Educ. giving Any educ. giving Any educ. giving 
     
Edulot -9.372* -33.49*** -0.033 -0.003 
 (5.153) (11.94) (0.032) (0.019) 
     
Observations 29,715 11,017 7,985 11,012 
     
Dataset 
COPPS  
(2000-2008) 
GVS  
(1989-1998) 
COPPS  
(2000-2008) 
GVS  
(1989-1998) 
Model FE Reg. OLS FE Logit Logit 
Robust standard errors (clustered at state-level) in parentheses 
Columns 3 and 4 report marginal effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
I also estimate logit models to assess how an education lottery impacts giving on the 
extensive margin. Results are presented in columns 3 and 4 for COPPS and GVS, respectively. 
In both models, the dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent reports any education 
giving. There is little response to the introduction of an education lottery. Thus, the baseline 
results are driven by changes on the intensive margin. This provides an initial indication that 
these results may not be entirely driven “fundraiser crowd-out.” If the only reason that 
contributions decrease is a decline in the number of donors being solicited, then we might expect 
to find that the drop in giving is driven by the extensive margin. 
There is reason to be concerned that the simple baseline results might be biased due to the 
large number of individuals who contribute nothing to education. This concern is addressed in 
two ways, with results reported in Table 2.6. In analyzing the COPPS data, I can restrict the 
sample to “education-givers” – individuals who donate to education at any point in the panel. 
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This substantially reduces the number of zero-contribution observations. This specification is 
also interesting in its own right as it estimates the impact of the treatment on the individuals who 
would be giving. As the GVS is not a panel, the GVS parallel to this is to restrict the sample to 
observations with positive education contributions.
20
 Results from these estimations are reported 
in Columns 1 and 3 respectively. Again, we see a significant decrease in giving in both 
datasets/decades but, as we would expect, the magnitude is much larger than the baseline result.  
 
Table 2.6. Alternative specifications -- Impact of education lottery on education giving 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Educ. giving Educ. giving Educ. giving Educ. giving 
 (Educ. givers 
only) 
 (Educ. givers 
only) 
 
     
Edulot -27.77* -8.44* -191.9*** -11.96* 
 (16.27) (5.12) (53.09) (7.01) 
     
Observations 9,279 28,426 1,801 11,017 
     
Dataset COPPS COPPS GVS GVS 
Model FE Tobit OLS Tobit 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at state level in Models 1 and 3, individual level in Models 2 and 4). Columns 
2 and 4 report marginal effect on the unconditional expected value of observed giving. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Models 2 and 4, I estimate Tobit models to address “censoring” of contributions at $0. 
There is not a straightforward and unbiased implementation of fixed effects in Tobit models for 
panel data, so in the COPPS data I instead estimate a standard Tobit model, adjusting standard 
errors for clustering at the individual-level (Column 3)
21
. Similarly, in Column 4 I report the 
results of estimating a Tobit model in the GVS data. For each of these specifications, I report the 
marginal effect of “Edulot” on the unconditional expected value of observed giving.  In both 
cases, we continue to observe a significant decrease in giving after accounting for the large 
number of censored observations. These estimates suggest that the introduction of an education 
lottery decreases average giving by between eight and twelve dollars; from an average of $40, 
this represents a drop in giving of between 20 and 30 percent. 
                                               
20 Restricting our attention to education givers would be problematic if the treatment changed the set of donors and 
not just the size of their contribution. 
21 Estimating a random-effects Tobit model yields similar results. 
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What is driving this drop in giving? The decrease is consistent with classic models of 
crowd-out; the expected introduction of a new source of funding for a public good serves as a 
substitute for individual contributions and as such donors reduce their level of giving.  There are 
of course alternative explanations. Kearney (2005) finds that, for the average lottery player, 
lottery spending is entirely financed by a reduction in non-gambling expenditures; thus, it is 
reasonable to expect that lottery spending may come at the expense of a particular category of 
non-gambling expenditures: charitable giving. If this were the case, we would expect charitable 
giving to decrease generally instead of finding a drop only in education-related giving.   
 
Table 2.7. Giving to other non-education related causes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Non-educ. 
giving 
Non-educ. 
giving 
Non-educ. 
giving 
Non-educ. 
giving 
     
Edulot 68.98 35.61 -25.38 22.69 
 (73.38) (47.70) (47.16) (32.15) 
     
Observations 29,715 28,426 11017 11,017 
     
Dataset COPPS COPPS GVS GVS 
Model FE-Reg Tobit OLS Tobit 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at state level in Models 1 and 3, individual level in Models 2 and 4). Columns 2 
and 4 report marginal effect on the unconditional expected value of observed giving. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
It is not the case that giving to other causes substantially decreases with the introduction 
of an education lottery. To show this, I again estimate the baseline specifications (Columns 1 and 
2 of Table 2.5) and the Tobit models (as in Table 2.6) but take “non-education giving” as the 
dependent variable.
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 Results are reported in Table 2.7. With the exception of Column 3 (where 
there is a small and insignificant drop in non-education giving), we see that giving to other 
causes actually slightly increases, but this increase is not significant. (The magnitudes of these 
coefficients are larger than those of the education-only estimations as the mean of giving to the 
                                               
22 In GVS, “non-education giving” is defined as total reported giving minus education giving. In COPPS, 
respondents do not report “total giving” and the way that they are asked to report giving to several causes changed 
between the 2002 wave and the remaining waves. However, questions regarding education giving, religious giving, 
“combined purpose” giving (e.g., United Way), health giving, and “help for the needy” are consistent across waves. 
Thus, in COPPS “non-education giving” is the sum of these consistently measured categories (religious, health, 
combined purpose, and needy).    
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sum of other causes is naturally much higher than giving to just education. For instance, average 
non-education giving in GVS is roughly $224.)   
Another alternative explanation is that donors view the lottery as a good substitute for 
education donations. This is the assumption made by Morgan (2000) in claiming that fixed prize 
raffles and lotteries can lead to higher provision than voluntary contributions; in his model, one 
dollar of lottery spending increases public good provision by the same amount that one dollar of 
direct donation does. However, lottery “contributions” are subsidized, in that there is some 
chance of winning a prize. As a result, his model predicts that individuals who would be donating 
to education in the absence of a lottery will shift their donation expenditures to the lottery. 
Because of this, direct donations drop but total contributions (donations + lottery expenditures) 
actually increase. Thus, a decrease in direct donations – as has been demonstrated thus far – 
arguably does not sufficiently demonstrate that overall public support for education has fallen.  
If a substitution from donations to lottery expenditure was driving the results, then we 
would expect the decrease in giving to stem entirely from individuals who play the lottery. Using 
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) we can identify individuals who do and do not play the 
lottery, and how much each group contributes to education related causes. Recall that the CES 
provides quarterly observations of respondents throughout the course of a year. Thus, I identify 
an individual as a “lottery nonparticipant” if they never report positive lottery expenditures. A 
“lottery participant” reports lottery expenditures at some point during the year.  
Using these data, I estimate fixed-effects regressions (Column 1 of Table 2.8) and (cross-
sectional) Tobits (Column 2), taking quarterly education giving as the dependent variable. I also 
estimate fixed-effects logits to assess the likelihood of giving any positive amount to education 
(Column 3). In the fixed-effects regression and logit, I include a control for income and also 
quarter, state, and year fixed effects. In addition to these controls, the Tobit also includes 
controls for education, gender, and race. I conduct each estimation for three samples: all 
observations (Panel A), lottery nonparticipants (Panel B), and lottery participants (Panel C).  
Comparing Panels B and C, there is more evidence that the drop in giving is driven by 
lottery nonparticipants in this setting. The estimated impact of the lottery in the fixed effects 
model is negative for both participants and nonparticipants, but the magnitude is larger (and 
more precisely estimated) for nonparticipants. Based on the Tobit estimations, the impact of the 
lottery remains negative and significant for nonparticipants, but is positive and insignificant for 
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participants. Finally, although the logit estimates are insignificant for all samples, the impact of 
the lottery on the extensive margin is again greater for nonparticipants. The generally larger 
negative impact of the lottery for nonparticipants and weak impact for participants is the 
opposite of what we expect if donors simply perceived the lottery as an alternative way to 
contribute. Moreover, these results paired with the results from Table 2.6 provide additional 
evidence that the drop in giving is not simply a more general shift of expenditures from charity 
to lottery.  This suggests that the main result is in line with classic models of crowd-out; 
donations drop because there is a new source of revenue (lottery revenue) that serves as a 
substitute for one’s own donations. 
 
Table 2.8. Consumer Expenditure Survey -- Quarterly education giving by lottery participation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 VARIABLES Educ. giving Educ. giving Any educ. giving 
 Model: FE-Reg. Tobit FE-Logit 
     
Panel A: Edulot -22.18** -0.103 -0.077 
Full sample  (8.593) (1.75) (0.081) 
     
 Observations 203,486 203,510 12,624 
     
Panel B: Edulot -24.30* -0.828*** -0.133 
Lottery nonparticipant  (13.80) (0.944) (0.091) 
     
 Observations 153,087 153,099 8,488 
     
Panel C: Edulot -16.92 0.636 0.039 
Lottery participant  (10.45) (2.64) (0.175) 
     
 Observations 50,399 50,411 4,136 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Columns 2 and 3 report marginal effects 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
To summarize, the introduction of an education lottery reduces donors’ contributions to 
education lotteries by 20 to 30 percent. This reduction appears to be driven by changes on the 
intensive margin; the lottery does not impact the probability that an individual will make a 
contribution. Moreover, there is evidence that the drop in giving might be explained by 
(expected) government spending crowding out private contributions, as opposed to individuals 
sacrificing charitable contributions to play the lottery. However, while the decrease in giving 
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seems to be a response to new government funds, it remains unclear whether this is a response by 
donors or a response by nonprofit firms. This issue is explored in the next section. 
2.6 NONPROFIT FIRM RESPONSE TO EDUCATION LOTTERY REVENUE 
How does the introduction of an education-funding lottery impact education-related nonprofits? 
We have already seen that an education lottery crowds out donations to education organizations, 
but it is possible that the result is driven by a reduction in the effort of fundraisers – either 
because they expect the marginal benefit of fundraising to be lower or because they have 
benefitted directly from lottery revenues and their level of need has reduced. Andreoni and 
Payne (2003) document that, in a more general setting, the crowd-out that results from 
government grants to nonprofits can almost be entirely explained by this “fundraising crowd-
out.” In some of their results that account for fundraising, donors’ contributions are either 
unaffected by or slightly increase with grants. One explanation for their observed lack of 
“traditional crowd out” (and, more generally, for the relatively small degree of crowd-out 
typically observed in response to government grants) is that individuals are largely unaware of 
government grants to nonprofits. In the United States, the introduction of a lottery to fund 
education tends to be highly publicized and as such individuals are more likely to be aware of 
this change in government funding. Thus, it may be reasonable to expect that the crowd-out 
observed in the previous section is driven by donor preferences.  
2.6.1 Data & empirical approach 
To examine whether this is the case, I next turn to data on nonprofit organizations’ revenue and 
expenses from federal tax returns spanning from 1989 to 2007. The data is collected and 
constructed by the IRS Statistics of Income division, and then compiled and provided for 
research purposes by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). Each year a subset of 
tax returns from nonprofit organizations that hold 501(c)(3) status are randomly sampled for 
inclusion in the dataset, which reports a variety of financial variables from the their tax return 
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(from the year sampled) such as operation expenses, charitable contributions received, 
fundraising expenses, etc. The dataset also includes groupings of nonprofit organizations by 
function, categorizing organizations as Arts, Education, Health, Human Services, or Other. 
A broad array of education-related organizations are represented in the data, including 
colleges, universities, preschools, libraries, remedial reading organizations, etc. However, as 
noted in the introduction, a vast majority of charitable activity in the education subsector is 
directed towards higher education. These data of course include private nonprofit colleges and 
universities, but many public universities and colleges are also represented: either because (1) 
they officially hold 501(c)(3) status or (2) their fundraising activities are accomplished through 
an affiliated but independent nonprofit foundation, both of which are common. 
While the dataset is not constructed as a true panel of nonprofit organizations, nonprofit 
organizations reappear in the data often enough that it can be treated as panel (as Andreoni & 
Payne do, for instance).
23
 Thus, I construct an unbalanced panel where each observation is a 
particular nonprofit firm in a particular year; there are typically (but not always) gaps between a 
nonprofit firm’s appearances in the panel but these appearances are randomly determined.  
The goal of this section is to examine the donations received and the fundraising behavior 
of nonprofit firms in response to the introduction of a lottery. Thus, I restrict my sample to firms 
that receive donations at any point in the panel. The resulting dataset consists of a total of 
192,478 observations and 19,505 unique nonprofit firms. 39,410 of these observations are 
education-related organizations.  
Throughout this section, I use a fixed-effects approach (with fixed-effects at the firm 
level) within the same difference-in-differences framework employed in previous sections. Two 
questions are of primary interest: First, how does the introduction of an education lottery impact 
the amount of donations received by education-related organizations? This essentially tests the 
robustness of the results from the previous section, but with much richer data. Here, for instance, 
we do not suffer from the censoring at $0 that plagued the assessment of the donor-level data.  
Second, are changes in donations received by nonprofits driven by changes in fundraising 
efforts?  
                                               
23 The median firm in the dataset I use appears seven times.  
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With these questions in mind, the primary outcome variables of interest is log of 
contributions received. I regress contributions on the “Edulot” indicator variable and, in all 
specifications, I include controls for the log of total revenue (excluding public support), the log 
of total expenditures (excluding fundraising), and year fixed effects. I additionally control for 
state-level covariates which may impact donations: log of income per capita, log of state 
population, log of education expenditure per capita, and log of other expenditures per capita. To 
address the impact of fundraising, I then control for fundraising expenditures. In doing so, I use 
an instrumental variables approach to account for the endogeneity between fundraising and 
donations received, using liabilities at the beginning of the fiscal year as an instrument for 
fundraising.
24
  
2.6.2 Results 
Table 2.9 provides an initial assessment of the impact that a lottery has on contributions received 
by nonprofits. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of fixed-effects estimations, with fixed-effects 
at the firm level, for education organizations and non-education organizations respectively. 
Consistent with the findings from the previous section, the introduction of an education lottery 
reduces the contributions received by education organizations – in this case, by an estimated 8%  
–  but has no significant impact on contributions to other causes.  
Columns 3 and 4 offer two robustness tests. Between 1989 and 2008, three states
25
 
attempted to introduce a lottery through referenda or ballot initiatives, butto achieve enough 
votes. In Column 3, I replace the “Edulot” dummy with a “Failed edulot” dummy. If the 
treatment effects here are merely picking up trends in giving that cause a state to introduce a 
lottery, the coefficient on “Failed edulot” should be negative and significant. While negative, the 
coefficient is substantially smaller in magnitude than the result from Column 1 and is not 
significantly different than zero. Column 4 adds a dummy to indicate a non-education lottery to 
                                               
24 Andreoni & Payne (2011) use this instrument for fundraising as well arguing that higher debt impacts the need for 
fundraising in a way that is unrelated to the amount of donations one expects to receive. 
25 Oklahoma in 1995, Alabama in 2000, Arkansas in 2001. 
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the main specification. No drop in giving to education organizations is observed when the lottery 
is not intended to benefit education. 
 
Table 2.9. The impact of an education lottery on contributions received 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Contributions 
received:  
Educ. orgs. 
Contributions 
received:  
Non-educ. orgs. 
Contributions 
received:  
Educ. orgs. 
Contributions 
received:  
Educ. orgs. 
 FE-Reg. FE-Reg. FE-Reg. FE-Reg. 
     
Edulot -0.0817*** 0.0119  -0.0734* 
 (0.0275) (0.0282)  (0.0369) 
Failed Edulot   -0.0247  
   (0.0817)  
Non-educ. lottery    0.0138 
    (0.0363) 
Other expenditures 0.339*** 0.282*** 0.340*** 0.339*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0142) (0.0373) (0.0374) 
Other revenues -0.0747*** -0.0659*** -0.0745*** -0.0747*** 
 (0.0216) (0.00876) (0.0217) (0.0217) 
State: income 0.850*** 1.053*** 0.783*** 0.851*** 
 (0.258) (0.294) (0.258) (0.258) 
State: population 0.433 0.666*** 0.264 0.425 
 (0.270) (0.198) (0.241) (0.280) 
State: educ. exp. 0.0443 0.0149 0.0565 0.0435 
 (0.105) (0.0889) (0.108) (0.104) 
State: non-educ. exp. -0.131 -0.217* -0.149 -0.135 
 (0.140) (0.115) (0.145) (0.139) 
     
Observations 38,585 129,267 38,585 38,585 
R-squared 0.263 0.066 0.227 0.331 
Robust standard errors (clustered at state-level) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Is the decrease in contributions to education organizations driven by a change in 
fundraising efforts? To answer this, I add a control for fundraising to the preceding specification. 
However, to account for potential endogeneity between fundraising and donations, I do so in an 
instrumental variables framework, taking liabilities as an instrument for fundraising. Results for 
education (Columns 1 and 2) and non-education organizations (Columns 3 and 4) are presented 
in Table 2.10. Columns 1 and 3 report the first stage of the instrumental variables regression. 
Notably, the introduction of an education lottery has very little impact on education 
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organizations’ fundraising expenditures (Column 1). Thus, in turning to the impact of the lottery 
after accounting for fundraising (Column 2), it is unsurprising to find that the estimated decrease 
in giving is very close to the estimate from Table 2.9.  
 
Table 2.10. The impact of an education lottery accounting for fundraising 
 (1) 
Educ. orgs: 
(2) 
Educ. orgs: 
(3) 
Educ. orgs: 
(4) 
Non-educ. 
orgs: 
(5) 
Non-educ. 
orgs: 
(6) 
Non-educ. 
orgs: 
 Fundraising Contributions 
received 
Contributions 
received 
Fundraising Contributions 
received 
Contributions 
received 
 FE-Reg.  
(first-stage) 
IV-FE-Reg. FE-Reg. FE-Reg.  
(first-stage) 
IV-FE-Reg. FE-Reg. 
       
Edulot -0.00296 -0.0689** -0.0650** 0.0685 0.00314 0.0247 
 (0.0324) (0.0279) (0.0296) (0.0422) (0.0412) (0.0372) 
Liabilities 0.0346**   0.0432***   
 (0.0130)   (0.00644)   
Fundraising  0.0614 0.130***  0.4851*** 0.176*** 
  (0.2656) (0.0116)  (0.1273) (0.00924) 
       
Obs. 27,905 27,905 28,828 58,374 58,374 61,996 
R-squared 0.452 0.155 0.512 0.245 0.469 0.363 
Robust standard errors (clustered at state-level) in parentheses 
Additional controls included as noted in text 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
On average the introduction of an education lottery reduces contributions received by 
education organizations by between 7-8%. To link this result more closely to the existing 
literature on crowding-out of charitable giving, we would ideally like to know the extent to 
which charitable giving decreases as a function of the amount that government spends. 
Answering this question is difficult because there is very little actual increase in spending, but 
we do know how much government claims it will spend. That is, in the state government finance 
data I observe “lottery proceeds,” which is the amount of money remaining for the beneficiaries 
after accounting for prizes awarded and administrative costs.  Thus, we can estimate the 
continuous impact of treatment by adopting the same specifications as before but replacing the 
“Edulot” dummy with log of lottery proceeds in education-lottery states. Appendix Table A4 
reports the results of these estimations for both education and non-education organizations. 
Based on the instrumental variable specification which controls for fundraising (Table A4, Panel 
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B), a 10% increase in lottery proceeds is associated with a 5.25% decrease in contributions 
received by education related organizations. 
 
2.6.3 Salience of government activity as an explanation for crowd-out? 
Consistent with the findings from Section 2.5, contributions to education-related organizations 
fall after the introduction of an education lottery, which is not true of contributions to other 
organizations. However, we can now say that this result appears to be driven by donors’ 
decisions to reduce their contributions as opposed to reduced fundraising efforts.  
This result differs from a recent literature which demonstrates that crowd-out is often 
largely explained by a change in nonprofits’ fundraising behavior (Andreoni & Payne, 2003; 
Andreoni & Payne, 2011; Heutel, 2009; Monti, 2010). I have suggested that an important 
difference between state lotteries and other forms of government spending is the high level of 
publicity that lotteries receive. Relative to government grants to nonprofits, donors are likely to 
be more aware of government spending resulting from lotteries – and therefore more likely to 
respond – in large part because states themselves heavily advertise the recipient of lottery 
revenues. 
Is there more direct evidence to support this suggestion? I take two approaches answer 
this question. First, if the crowd-out observed in this paper is indeed driven by donors’ awareness 
of government activity and if this awareness is (at least in part) the result of government 
advertising, then we would expect the magnitude of the crowd-out to increase with governments’ 
advertising activities. The Survey of Government Finances (used in Section 2.3) reports states’ 
yearly lottery administrative costs, which includes advertising expenditures.
26
 Advertising 
expenditures are not reported, so I use the ratio of administrative costs to ticket sales as a proxy 
for advertising. In addition to advertising, administrative costs include the cost of printing and 
distributing tickets which obviously varies with the number of tickets sold, so most of the 
                                               
26 According to the Census Bureau, administrative costs “includes salaries of officials as well as advertising, 
supplies, and the like.” 
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variation in administrative costs after accounting for tickets sales presumably comes from 
advertising. 
I extend the previous empirical specifications (FE and FE-IV-Regressions controlling for 
fundraising) to include controls for the ratio of administrative costs to ticket sales 
(“Advertising”) and the interaction of “Advertising” with “Edulot.” In doing so, I re-center 
“Advertising” around its mean so that the main effect of “Edulot” can be interpreted as the 
impact of an education lottery evaluated at the mean level of advertising. If crowd-out is 
increasing in advertising we would expect the coefficient on “Edulot X Advertising” to be 
negative.  
This is indeed the case, as can be seen in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.11 which report the 
results of these estimations for education organizations. Based on Column 3, an education lottery 
is associated with a 6% decrease in contributions received by education organizations. For each 
additional cent of ticket sales that a state devotes to administrative costs, contributions decrease 
by an additional 1%. The same significant relationship does not hold for non-education 
organizations (Columns 2 and 4). 
 
Table 2.11. Crowd-out and awareness of government spending - Proxy for advertising expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Contributions 
received: 
Educ. orgs. 
(FE-Reg.) 
Contributions 
received: 
Non-educ. orgs. 
(FE-Reg.) 
Contributions 
received: 
Educ. orgs. 
(FE-IV-Reg.) 
Contributions 
received: 
Non-educ. orgs. 
(FE-IV-Reg.) 
     
Edulot -0.0686** 0.0263 -0.0594** 0.0154 
 (0.0286) (0.0280) (0.0256) (0.0393) 
Edulot X Advertising -1.274*** -0.589 -0.988** -0.247 
 (0.387) (0.485) (0.466) (0.488) 
Advertising 0.655*** 0.00285 0.556*** -0.243 
 (0.200) (0.270) (0.197) (0.221) 
     
Observations 38,585 129,267 27,905 58,374 
R-squared 0.294 0.068 0.156 0.000 
Robust standard errors (clustered at state-level) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A second approach allows for the possibility that the political method of introducing the 
lottery impacts crowd-out. In particular, seven of the twelve states that introduced an education 
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lottery between 1989 and 2008 did so through referenda or ballot initiatives.
27
 The remaining 
states introduced their lottery through legislative action. One might expect that citizens are more 
aware of the lottery and its beneficiary when they vote directly on the issue. Thus, if salience is 
important to crowd-out, there should be more crowd-out in states that introduced their lotteries 
through direct voting (referenda/ballot initiatives).   
I test whether this is the case in Table 2.12, which includes a separate treatment dummy 
for legislative action and direct vote states. Columns 1 and 3 report the results of these 
estimations for education organizations. Crowd-out is indeed higher in Direct vote states. The 
same relationship is not observed for non-education organizations (Columns 2 and 4). 
 
Table 2.12. Crowd-out and awareness of government spending -- Political method of lottery adoption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Contributions 
received: 
Educ. orgs. 
(FE-Reg.) 
Contributions 
received: 
Non-educ. orgs. 
(FE-Reg.) 
Contributions 
received: 
Educ. orgs. 
(FE-IV-Reg.) 
Contributions 
received: 
Non-educ. orgs. 
(FE-IV-Reg.) 
     
Edulot (Legislative) -0.0627* -0.00842 -0.0413 -0.00215 
 (0.0329) (0.0296) (0.0473) (0.0468) 
Edulot (Direct vote) -0.0921** 0.0261 -0.0842*** 0.00658 
 (0.0355) (0.0374) (0.0275) (0.0562) 
     
Observations 38,585 129,267 27,905 58,374 
R-squared 0.266 0.066 0.155 0.000 
Robust standard errors (clustered at state-level) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Of course, these results should be taken as merely suggestive: we cannot directly observe 
advertising expenditures, nor do we know that donors are more aware of the lottery beneficiary in 
“Direct voting” states. However, the results are consistent with the suggestion that a higher level 
of awareness of government activity leads to more crowd-out. This may help explain why 
crowd-out is driven by donors when the source of funding is a state lottery, while crowd-out is 
driven mostly by nonprofits when the source of funding is much-less-publicized government 
grants. 
                                               
27 These states are Georgia, Missouri, Virginia, Washington, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Oklahoma. 
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper I assess the impact that education-funding state lotteries have on total funding 
available for education. I find that – for lotteries introduced between 1989 and 2008 – the 
introduction of an education lottery fails to significantly increase state education expenditures. 
Instead, unrelated expenditures increase. Thus, the lottery does not change government’s 
contribution to education. Though education relies on government for funding, it is also heavily 
supported by charitable donations. The absence of an increase in government funding with the 
introduction of a lottery implies that any change in overall funding therefore depends on the 
effect that lotteries have on charitable contributions. 
I find that charitable contributions to education significantly decrease after the 
introduction of an education lottery; contributions received by education-related nonprofit firms 
drop by 8% with a lottery. There is evidence to suggest that this drop is driven by a crowding-out 
of donations, consistent with classic models of voluntary public good provision. In particular, I 
am able to rule out alternative explanations that might suggest that individuals are merely 
shifting charitable expenditures to lottery expenditures.  
Additionally, unlike recent work that finds that crowd-out stemming from grants to 
nonprofits is often mostly explained by nonprofit fundraising behavior, here the effect is almost 
entirely driven by donors. I argue that this is because of the high level of publicity that lotteries 
and their intended beneficiaries receive. Consistent with this suggestion, I show that crowd-out is 
increasing in a measure of state advertising activity. Also, crowd-out is higher for states that 
introduce a lottery through referenda instead of legislative action, which is presumably less 
salient to citizens. Though the potential importance of salience as a determinant of charitable 
crowd-out has been discussed in recent work by Monti (2010), to my knowledge this is the first 
paper to provide empirical evidence that crowd-out is indeed increasing in awareness of 
government activity. 
There are of course a variety of policy-oriented reasons why some oppose state-
sponsored lotteries; for instance, it has been repeatedly shown that, as a tax, lotteries are highly 
regressive. This paper highlights an additional trade-off that states face in implementing a lottery 
as a way to fund public goods. While some existing work shows that earmarking for a “good 
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cause” increases a lottery’s revenue (Landry & Price, 2007), I find that this comes at a price: 
private, voluntary support for the cause falls.  
However, the fact that state governments are vocal about the particular cause being 
supported (education) seems to be critical to this result. This suggests that a government that is 
vocal about supporting “good causes,” but does not support or highlight any one cause in 
particular, may enjoy the benefits of higher revenue without disrupting charitable activity. The 
UK National Lottery operates in this manner, advertising that the Lottery supports “380,000 … 
good causes … across the UK.”28 Indeed, in an analysis of UK charities that have received 
lottery grants, Andreoni et al. (2013) find no evidence of charitable crowd-out.
29
 
 
                                               
28 http://www.national-lottery.co.uk/player/p/goodcausesandwinners.ftl 
29 In fact, for small organizations, they find evidence of crowd-in. 
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3.0  THE SUPPLY & DEMAND OF MOTIVATED LABOR: WHEN SHOULD WE 
EXPECT TO SEE NONPROFIT WAGE GAPS? 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A long literature examines differences in wages across the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. Some 
empirical work finds clear evidence that nonprofit workers earn less. The most prominent 
explanation for this finding is the “labor donation hypothesis,” which suggests that some 
individuals enjoy nonmonetary benefits from working in a nonprofit and as such are willing to 
work for less.
30
 An alternative explanation is that nonprofits tend to locate in lower-paying 
industries, so composition effects rather than differential preferences of workers may drive the 
observation of a nonprofit wage differential. However, as demonstrated by Leete (2001) even 
after carefully accounting for industry and occupation, a nonprofit wage differential exists in 
some industries but not others – a puzzling result for either of these two prominent explanations. 
I offer an explanation for the emergence of wage differentials in some industries but not 
others and, in doing so, revisit the mechanism through which these wage differentials arise more 
generally. Building on a point made by Preston (1989), I test the hypothesis that a nonprofit 
wage differential should exist within an industry when the share of labor demanded by nonprofits 
is low relative to for-profits. I start from the assumption that some workers are in fact willing to 
donate their labor and draw from a recent theoretical literature examining the impact of 
motivation on labor market outcomes (Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Heyes, 2005; Delfgaauw & Dur, 
2007; Ghatak & Mueller, 2011). Suppose there exist “motivated” types – who receive 
                                               
30 “Labor donation theory” or the “donative labor hypothesis” is an idea which has been suggested in various forms 
by a variety of researchers; see, for instance, Weisbrod (1983), Preston (1989), or Leete (2006) for a thorough 
review. 
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nonmonetary benefits from working for a nonprofit – and “standard” types – who, holding wage 
constant, do not differentiate between nonprofit and for-profit jobs. As long as there are enough 
motivated workers to meet their labor demands, nonprofits can minimize costs by offering a low 
wage (thereby, only attracting motivated applicants.) However, if nonprofit labor demand is high 
relative to for-profit firms, the nonprofit cannot rely on motivated workers alone to fill their 
demand and must offer wages comparable to that of for-profits in order to attract standard 
workers.  
I test this hypothesis empirically in two stages. In both stages, rather than attempting to 
make comparisons across very different industries, I examine the impact of the nonprofit share of 
labor within industries but across localities. The first stage assesses the relationship between 
nonprofit share of labor and wage differentials at an economy-wide level using data from the 
2000 Public-Use Microdata 5%-sample of the United States Census. I construct industry/locality-
specific nonprofit shares of labor and include a detailed set of industry fixed effects in all 
specifications. I find evidence that low nonprofit share – where I argue that there is a sufficient 
number of motivated workers to meet labor demand – is indeed associated with larger negative 
wage differentials; this is almost entirely driven by college-educated workers. However, there are 
a number of alternative explanations for this result that data limitations do not allow me to 
address. In particular, there are reasons to be concerned that there is endogeneity between 
nonprofit share and relative nonprofit wages. Additionally, in the economy-wide data, I cannot 
rule out that low nonprofit share nonprofits attract lower quality workers and the lower wage 
merely reflects this.  
Thus, in the second stage, I focus my attention only on the nursing home industry, for 
which I have much richer firm-level data on roughly 95% of nursing homes in the United States. 
Again, exploiting variation in nonprofit share across localities, I replicate the result from the 
economy-wide data. I then provide evidence that suggests that this result is not driven by: (1) 
differences in the competitive environment faced by nonprofits in low nonprofit share areas, (2) 
endogeneity between nonprofit share and wage differentials or (3) lower quality workers in low 
nonprofit share areas. In fact, I find that nonprofit workers in low nonprofit share areas produce 
higher quality output (despite being paid less). This is consistent with the impliciations of a 
simple model I present in section 3.4; in particular, by maintaining lower wages nonprofits 
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attract only workers who are “motivated” and who therefore supply higher effort than is required 
of them. 
Thus, consistent with my theoretical predictions, I provide evidence that nonprofit wages 
are lowest (and nonprofit quality highest) relative to for-profits when nonprofit share (NPS) is 
low. Based on my model, I argue that this is driven by nonprofits’ ability to hire motivated types 
exclusively when nonprofit share is low. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY), I conclude the empirical analysis by providing suggestive evidence that 
nonprofit workers in low nonprofit share areas are indeed a different “type” of worker. Low-NPS 
nonprofit workers report higher job satisfaction and are more likely to engage in prosocial 
activities outside of their job. The NLSY data, which includes much richer worker-level data, 
also allows me to rule out other possible alternative explanations for my results. For instance, I 
can rule out that the results are entirely explained by differences in benefits, differences in 
cognitive abilities of workers, and differences in firm size (which, according to existing 
empirical work, is also shown to impact wages.) 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In section 3.2, I review in more detail 
existing research on nonprofit wage differentials. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, I discuss the 
predictions that I test empirically, first in a general way (section 3.3) and then with more 
precision using a simple model (section 3.4).  In section 3.5, I describe the general empirical 
approach used throughout and apply the theoretical predictions to the environment studied. 
Section 3.6 reports the economy-wide analysis; I show that nonprofit share of labor indeed 
appears to be an important determinant of the existence of wage differences across sectors 
(primarily for highly educated workers.) In section 3.7, I use a richer dataset from a particular 
industry to rule out concerns and alternative explanations that cannot be addressed using the 
economy-wide data. Section 3.8 provides evidence to suggest that low-NPS nonprofits attract a 
different “type” of worker. Section 3.9 concludes. 
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3.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
 
The main challenge in determining whether labor donation theory is a reasonable model of 
nonprofit labor is finding the appropriate for-profit workers to compare nonprofit wages against. 
That is, if what appears to be a “nonprofit” wage differential is in fact driven by differences in 
industry composition across the sectors, then all that exists is an industry wage differential. Two 
main strategies have been employed to account for the differences in industry composition across 
the two sectors: (1) comparing workers within a particular industry/occupation and (2) including 
detailed industry and occupation fixed effects in economy-wide data. However, the conclusions 
that result from each of these strategies have been inconsistent.  
The earliest assessments of labor donation theory are typically of the first variety, in part 
because the data necessary to (properly) employ the second strategy did not yet exist. For 
instance, Weisbrod (1983) compares public interest lawyers to private lawyers and demonstrates 
that, controlling for observable characteristics, public interest lawyers earn significantly less. 
Moreover, he provides evidence from survey data that suggests that these lawyers actively select 
into the lower-paying field -- public-interest lawyers report being fully aware of the potential 
earnings they have lost and almost uniformly indicate that these losses are “worth it.” Frank 
(1996) provides a similar result. However, using the same data as Weisbrod but with a different 
econometric approach, Goddeeris (1988) finds little evidence of a pay gap between public 
interest and private lawyers. Preston (1988), in a comparison of nonprofit and for-profit daycare 
center workers, finds no wage differential in non-federally regulated centers (and a positive 
nonprofit wage differential in centers that are regulated.) However, the absence of a (negative) 
wage differential is perhaps unsurprising in this context as more recent research demonstrates 
that we primarily observe differentials amongst highly educated and “white-collar” workers 
(Leete, 2001), a result which is found in this paper as well. Borjas et al. (1983) and Holtmann 
and Idson (1993) find little evidence of a pay gap between wages in nonprofit and for-profit 
nursing homes. 
Thus, amongst the papers that attempt to determine whether the implications of labor 
donation theory hold in specific contexts, no conclusion has been reached. It remains unclear as 
to whether these divergent results stem from particular (and not yet well defined) characteristics 
 40 
of the industries that have been considered or if this is suggestive that, generally speaking, the 
implications of labor donation theory are not widely applicable. Thus, more recent research has 
examined economy-wide data to determine whether labor donation theory is meaningful at a 
more general level. An early attempt to do so indeed finds a significant nonprofit wage 
differential, but suffers from a lack of quality data (Preston, 1989); namely, Preston uses data 
from the Current Population Survey, which had not yet started asking respondents to identify 
whether they were nonprofit workers.  
Ruhm and Borkoski (2003) also use data from the Current Population Survey to examine 
whether differentials exist on an economy-wide level, but are able to specifically identify 
nonprofit workers. They find a small negative wage differential that is not significantly different 
than zero. Leete (2001), using 1990 Census microdata, employs a full range of industry and 
occupation fixed effects. While she too fails to detect an economy-wide wage differential, she 
does find large and significant wage differentials in particular industries. Narcy (2011) examines 
wages across sectors in France and finds a significant negative wage-differential at an economy-
wide level. 
Although attempts to test the implications of the labor donation hypothesis (by searching 
for wage gaps) have led to inconclusive results, there is accumulating direct evidence of 
differences in workers and willingness to donate labor across sectors. In a 1977 survey, nonprofit 
workers were more likely to report that their work is more important to them than the money 
they earn (Mirvis and Hackett, 1983).  Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of 
Youth, Benz (2005) documents higher levels of job satisfaction amongst nonprofit employees. 
Lanfranchi et al. (2010)  find that nonprofit workers’ “ideal number of hours worked” is higher 
than that of for-profit workers and that they are willing to receive less compensation for 
additional hours worked. Gregg et al. (2011) show that workers who are more willing to “donate 
labor” (as measured by their willingness to engage in unpaid overtime work) are indeed more 
likely to sort into the nonprofit sector. Serra et al. (2011) obtain survey- and experimental-based 
proxies of prosocial motivations and find that these measures are predictive of health 
professionals’ selection into the nonprofit sector. 
Thus, there appears to be some evidence of workers donating their labor, though the 
circumstances under which this leads to wage differentials is unclear. The only potential 
consensus to draw is that the existence and magnitude of nonprofit wage differentials depends 
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heavily on the particular industry and/or occupation in question. This is demonstrated most 
clearly by Leete (2001). Yet, it remains unclear why we would observe a wage differential in 
some industries but not in others and also what factors are important in determining which 
industries are impacted. 
My findings are also closely related to the more general literature on compensating 
differentials. Any job characteristic that is desirable to the marginal worker (such as the 
opportunity to support a nonprofit’s mission or a low risk of being injured on the job) might be 
expected to generate lower wages (Rosen, 1986). However, like the literature on nonprofit 
wages, attempts to test  the theory of compensating differentials has historically led to mixed 
results (Brown, 1980). One way to view this paper, then, is an attempt to locate the marginal 
worker (using across-locality variation in nonprofit share) and determine whether she suffers a 
wage penalty to compensate for the opportunity to work for her preferred job, rather than asking 
whether workers on average suffer a wage penalty. However, this paper is distinguished from 
much of the compensating wage differentials literature in an important sense; the workers 
attracted to nonprofits (despite low wages) differ not only in their willingness to accept lower 
wages but also – according to my argument – in their willingness to supply more effort once 
hired. That is, the wage gap is not merely a way to equalize utility across jobs, but also serves as 
a screening device to achieve the optimal match between nonprofit firms and motivated workers.  
3.3 GENERAL HYPOTHESES & CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE  
With the existing literature on nonprofit wage differentials in mind, I reconsider the labor 
donation hypothesis focusing more specifically on the circumstances under which we should 
expect nonprofit firms to offer lower wages. In doing so, I hope to provide a better understanding 
of why nonprofit wage differentials are observed in some cases but not others, particularly given 
recent direect evidence that  nonprofit workers are willing to donate thier labor. Broadly 
speaking, the claims I make are the following:   
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1.  A wage differential is observed for industries with low nonprofit share of labor relative to the 
for-profit sector.  
2.  For industries with large nonprofit share of labor, the difference between for-profit and 
nonprofit wages approaches zero.  
 
The intuition behind these claims (which is described with greater precision in a simple 
model in the next section) begins with the assumption that there are in fact some workers who 
are willing to donate their labor to a nonprofit firm. (Throughout, I refer to this set of workers as 
“motivated.”) However, the presence of motivated workers alone does not guarantee that we 
would observe wage differentials. Specifically, it must be in nonprofit firms’ interest to maintain 
wages below the market wage. Of course, if workers are willing to accept lower wages, then 
offering the lowest wage possible minimizes costs. (Additionally, if nonprofit firms have a 
preference for motivated workers, then they can guarantee that only these workers will apply by 
setting a wage lower than the for-profit wage.) 
However, this is only possible if the total demand for labor in the nonprofit sector does 
not exceed the number of motivated workers. Otherwise, the nonprofit firm is forced to attract 
standard workers; thus, the nonprofit firm must offer the for-profit wage and, because motivation 
is not observable, it must pay this wage to all workers (including those who are willing to work 
for less). As a result, whether a nonprofit wage differential is observed or not in an industry 
depends crucially on whether the nonprofit share of labor in that industry exceeds the proportion 
of motivated workers. 
The above argument requires that the “motivated” worker receives some form of 
nonmonetary benefit from working at a nonprofit firm. The previous literature on labor donation 
theory offers a number of reasons why this might be true. Workers may receive “warm glow” or 
“moral satisfaction” from contributing to the production of a public good (Preston (1989), Frank 
(1996)). Rose-Ackerman (1996) suggests that committed workers may be easier to attract 
because “the lack of equity holders is a signal to employees that their selflessness is not 
enriching someone else.” Hansmann (1980) proposes a slightly different motivation: Even if 
nonprofits and for-profits in an industry produce relatively similar goods, nonprofits’ 
nondistribution constraint reduces the incentive to deviate from the promised level of quality. 
Thus, workers who care about the quality of service provided at their firm, may be willing to 
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sacrifice wages to work in a nonprofit. Still other motivations are possible: Some may prefer the 
work environment offered by nonprofits; there is some evidence that nonprofit jobs offer greater 
autonomy, variety, and challenge than for-profit jobs (Mirvis & Hacket, 1983).  Alternatively, 
individuals may be motivated to work at a nonprofit to signal to themselves or others that they 
are the type of person that would do so (Benabou & Tirole, 2006).   
3.4 MODEL & RESULTING PREDICTIONS 
In this section, I offer a simple model to add precision and more carefully consider the argument 
made above. The model builds upon a literature on signaling and screening of worker 
motivations (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2007; Heyes, 2005), which suggests that, if some workers are 
motivated to work in a particular job, but motivation is not observable, firms might use their 
offered wage as a screening device. By setting a wage lower than the reservation wage of 
standard workers, they are guaranteed to attract only motivated workers who receive additional 
nonmonetary utility from working for the firm. Here I simplify and adapt the model of 
Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) to understand the implications of this model in the context of 
nonprofit wage-setting. 
 
3.4.1 Basic environment 
Suppose there are N workers who choose between job offers at a nonprofit firm (NP) or a for-
profit firm (FP). Job offers at each firm are defined solely by wage; I assume required effort is 
identical across the two jobs. FP serves as an outside option for workers not willing to work at 
NP; I therefore assume that the FP wage is the lowest wage that standard workers are willing to 
accept. NP chooses a wage to minimize costs. 
All workers choose a job (NP or FP) and effort level to maximize u(x)=wj – c(x), where 
wj is the wage in firm j, and c(x) is the cost of effort. However, wj is only received if x≥e, where e 
is the required level of effort at either NP or FP. I assume that there are two types of workers: S 
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(standard) and M (motivated), where the proportion of M workers is PM (with 0< PM<1). The 
utility standard workers receive is given by uS(x|FP)=wFP – x
2
 regardless of employer. Motivated 
workers, to some extent, derive positive utility from offering effort to the firm. Thus, motivated 
workers' utility depends on the firm that they work for:   
 
    • If employed by FP: uM(x|FP)=wFP – x
2 
    • If employed by NP: uM(x|NP)=wFP – (x –m)
2
 
 
Motivation is captured by the incorporating m into the cost-of-effort function. Under this 
specification, utility is not strictly decreasing in effort and workers have some preferred level of 
effort that is greater than zero. 
3.4.2 Worker Behavior 
FP firms offer the minimum acceptable wage (wFP=e
2
), so workers never prefer to not work. 
Standard workers choose jobs based solely on wages. Thus, they choose FP so long as wFP>wNP 
and supply minimum effort in either job.
31
 Motivated workers supply minimal effort e in FP but 
supply effort m>e in NP. Thus, they choose NP when wNP ≥ wFP – e
2
. 
3.4.3 Nonprofit firm behavior 
The nonprofit firm aims to minimize labor costs while producing the quantity, q, that is 
demanded by the market. That is, the firm chooses a wage to solve the cost minimization 
problem: minw[wNP nNP] such that q=k nNP e(w) where nNP is the number of workers in NP, k is 
the marginal product of a unit of effort, and e(w) is the average effort provided by NP workers. 
Average effort e(w) depends on the type of workers that sort into NP based on offered wages: 
 
                                               
31 We will assume that if wages are equal across jobs, standard workers apply for an NP job and return to FP if 
rejected (this is purely for convenience and does not impact the basic message of the argument). 
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Thus, NP will never set wNP < wFP – e
2
 or wNP > wFP. Because e < m, average effort is 
highest when wFP – e
2 ≤ wNP < wFP. However, the NP firm can only produce   and set a wage in 
this region if there are enough motivated workers to do so; that is: nNP/N ≤ PM. If the necessary 
share of nonprofit labor exceeds the proportion of motivated workers – nNP/N > PM – the firm is 
forced to offer a wage greater than or equal to that of FP to attract standard workers and produce 
 . 
3.4.4 Resulting predictions 
NP minimizes costs by choosing wNP = wFP – e
2
 when nNP/N ≤ PM and wNP = wFP otherwise. 
With wNP = wFP – e
2
, only motivated types sort into the nonprofit sector. Otherwise, both types 
may do so. This yields two predictions:  
1. Thus, a nonprofit wage differential emerges only when nonprofit labor share is relatively 
low and does not exceed the proportion of motivated workers in society. As nonprofit 
share increases, the gap between wages across the two sectors shrinks. 
2. Average effort is higher in nonprofits when nonprofit share is low. As nonprofit share 
increases, the gap between effort across the two sectors shrinks. 
For the most part, the empirical analysis will address the first prediction. However, in 
Section 3.7 (where I have sufficiently detailed data to assess the quality of workers’ output) I 
provide evidence in favor of the second prediction. 
3.5 EMPIRICAL APPROACH & HYPOTHESES 
Given the predictions from Section 3.4, we should observe nonprofit wage differentials in 
industries with relatively low nonprofit labor shares (relative to for-profits in the same industry). 
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For an initial sense of whether this prediction is reasonable, I plot nonprofit share for each 
industry included in Leete’s (2001) analysis against her estimated wage differentials (Figure 3.1). 
Leete does not discuss the relationship between nonprofit share and her estimated wage gaps, but 
Figure 3.1 shows that her results are consistent with the argument that negative wage gaps should 
appear more often when nonprofit share is low. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Relationship between estimated wage differential and nonprofit share from Leete (2001) 
 (Each point represents a particular industry) 
 
However, because the industries being compared in Figure 3.1 are very different from 
one another, we should be hesitant to draw inferences from this simple relationship; the 
relationship could stem from other characteristics of industries that lead them to simultaneously 
display low nonprofit shares and larger wage differentials. This problem is of course part of the 
reason that there is little consensus in the existing literature that examines very specific contexts; 
namely, it is unclear whether to interpret the absence of a wage differential in some contexts as 
evidence against labor donation theory generally speaking or as simply stemming from some 
specific characteristics of that particular context. 
To avoid this problem, I will instead compare wage differentials within industries but 
across localities. This will be accomplished by including a full range of industry fixed effects. 
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For instance, rather than comparing the wage differential amongst radio workers (an industry 
with low nonprofit labor share) to that of hospital workers (an industry with very high nonprofit 
labor share), I compare the wage differential of radio workers in a locality with low radio-worker 
nonprofit share to the differential amongst radio workers in a different locality with high 
nonprofit labor share. If the argument above is correct, then, for a particular industry, nonprofit 
wage differentials should be largest amongst localities with low nonprofit share and wages 
should be roughly equal in localities with high nonprofit shares.
32
  
To summarize then, the broad explanation I offer for variance in differentials across 
industries is that, in industries with low nonprofit share, there are enough motivated workers in 
society (and within the particular industry in question) such that the nonprofit sector can rely 
only on those workers and therefore does not need to match the for-profit wage in an attempt to 
attract standard workers. However, for industries with large nonprofit shares (like hospitals) all 
of the motivated workers have already been exploited and firms must raise wages to attract other 
workers. Thus, wage differentials are only observed in industries with low nonprofit shares. The 
empirical hypotheses I will test to assess this claim are that, within industries, wage differentials 
will exist in localities with low industry/locality-specific nonprofit share, but as nonprofit share 
increases, the differential will be eliminated. 
                                               
32 Note that this argument assumes some limitations on mobility. Namely, we might think that if moving is costless, 
motivated workers would locate to areas where the nonprofit wage differential has been eliminated where they can 
obtain both higher pay and the nonmonetary benefits of working for a nonprofit. However, keep in mind that in the 
explanation provided above, when nonprofit share is low and a wage differential exists, motivated workers are only 
competing with other motivated to obtain a particular position. This is no longer true when wages are equal across 
sectors, in which case all workers are competing for the nonprofit job. This barrier to entry to nonprofit jobs in areas 
with high nonprofit shares combined with some mobility cost makes it reasonable to assume that, to some degree 
(and at least in the short-run), tied to their current location. Moreover, insofar as mobility does pose a threat to this 
empirical strategy, it would only lead to an underestimate of the true effects. 
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3.6 ECONOMY-WIDE ANALYSIS 
3.6.1 Data and estimation approach 
I first test the claim that nonprofit wage differentials depend on the nonprofit share of labor using 
microdata from the 5%-sample of the 2000 Census. Specifically, I construct nonprofit shares by 
industry at the Super-PUMA level.
33
 That is, for a particular industry i and Super-PUMA s, 
nonprofit share (NPS) is constructed as the sum of observed nonprofit workers divided by the 
sum of all observed workers in the industry/locality:  
 
 
Because we are exclusively interested in labor markets where workers can sort into either 
nonprofit or for-profit jobs, I omit industry-locality groupings with nonprofit share equal to 0 or 
1 – that is, labor markets totally dominated by either nonprofits or for-profits. Moreover, to avoid 
unreliable NPS measures I omit industry-locality groupings with less than 100 total workers, 
though results are similar without this restriction. 
Restricting attention to full-time workers in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, the main 
estimating equation is given by:  
 
                                               
33 A PUMA, or Public Use Microdata Area, is a geographic grouping with a population of at least 100,000 
constructed by the Census Bureau to ensure confidentiality of respondents. A Super-PUMA is a grouping of several 
PUMAs and has a total population of at least 400,000; Super-PUMAs are therefore relatively uniform in population, 
which is one reason that I use Super-PUMAs to estimate nonprofit share rather than, for instance, counties or 
metropolitan areas where there is great variance in population across localities. I use Super-PUMAs rather than 
PUMAs to increase the precision of the constructed nonprofit share measure. PUMAs are arguably better 
representations of “localities” but, being much smaller, counts of workers in particular industries would be a much 
noisier representation of the actual number of workers per industry in the area. This trade-off is not faced in the 
industry-specific analysis of the next section. Super-PUMAs are also more uniform in size than other geographic 
concepts (e.g., counties and metropolitan areas) which is important for maintaining a constant degree of precision in 
the constructed nonprofit share across localities. 
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where “nonprofit” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the worker works for a nonprofit firm and 
“nonprofit X NPS” is the interaction of nonprofit employment and industry-locality specific 
nonprofit share.  
The “wage” variable is constructed by dividing an individual’s total pre-tax wage and 
salary income for the preceding year, as reported in the Census microdata, by the number of 
hours of they worked. The income reported in the Census includes not just wages and salary, but 
also  commissions, cash bonuses, tips, and other money income received from an employer. 
In all specifications, I include industry and occupation fixed effects, as well as either state 
or super-PUMA fixed effects. The industry fixed effects control for any industry-specific 
features and therefore ensure that we are comparing wage differentials within particular 
industries but across localities. I also include a variety of controls such as education, potential 
experience (calculated as age - years of education - 6), gender, marital status, and race. To 
attempt to better capture true (but unobserved) workforce experience by interacting gender, 
marital status, and “potential experience” to allow for, for instance, women’s time spent out of 
the workforce for maternity.   Throughout this section, standard errors are clustered at the Super-
PUMA level.  
The nonprofit wage differential, controlling for individual-level characteristics denoted X, 
is given by:  
 
  
If the argument from previous sections is correct, then we should observe a large negative 
nonprofit wage differential when NPS is low. However, this differential should become less 
negative as NPS increases. Thus, we would expect to find that β1<0 and β2>0. 
It is worth noting potential empirical concerns before moving on. A common concern in 
assessing nonprofit wage differentials is nonrandom selection into nonprofit sector: perhaps 
workers in the nonprofit sector are of unobservably lower quality and would earn lower wages in 
either sector. This concern is minimized here in two ways: first, while this is a serious concern, 
this argument cannot immediately explain why nonprofit wage gaps would vary with nonprofit 
share (which I find that they do.) Second, in later sections I use richer data to demonstrate that 
(a) workers do higher quality work in low nonprofit share areas and (b) my results survive even 
after controlling for cognitive ability (as measured by Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
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Battery scores in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.) Another potential concern is 
endogeneity of wages and nonprofit share. The Census data do not allow me to deal with this, 
but in Section 3.7, I use the much richer nursing home data to minimize this concern by using 
two instrumental variables for nonprofit share. 
3.6.2 Results 
3.6.2.1 Main results 
 
Table 3.1 presents the estimation of the main specification, with and without Super-PUMA fixed 
effects. Negative nonprofit wage differentials exist when nonprofit share is low as can be seen 
from the significant and negative “nonprofit” coefficient. With nonprofit share close to zero, 
nonprofit workers earn 3% to 4% less than for-profit workers. This wage differential decreases 
as nonprofit share increases, as can be seen from the significant and positive “Nonprofit X NP 
share” coefficient.  
 
Table 3.1. Baseline specifications 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES ln(Wage) ln(Wage) 
   
Nonprofit -0.0357*** -0.0273*** 
 (0.00471) (0.00408) 
Nonprofit X NP share 0.136*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0110) (0.00955) 
NP share -0.0573** -0.0668*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0197) 
   
State FEs X  
Super-PUMA FEs  X 
   
Observations 899,124 899,124 
R-squared 0.434 0.450 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at super-PUMA level) in parentheses. Both specifications 
include additional controls as noted in the text. 
 
However, turning to Table 3.2 which splits the sample into “high education” and “low 
education” groups – with “high education” defined as individuals holding a bachelor’s degree or 
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higher – we see that the predicted relationship between wage gaps and nonprofit share is much 
stronger for highly educated individuals. Indeed, while we observe the hypothesized signs on the 
coefficients in Table 3.1 (which includes high and low education groups), when we restrict our 
attention to highly educated individuals (columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.2) we observe both the 
hypothesized signs and much larger magnitudes. Highly educated workers earn between 8% and 
10% less than their for-profit counterparts when nonprofit share is low; again, as nonprofit share 
increases this wage gap is eliminated. 
Given the model and intuition behind the testable predictions, the fact that this effect is 
largely restricted to highly educated individuals is not surprising. The argument made in previous 
sections depends heavily on the idea that workers are tied to a particular industry and sort to for-
profits or nonprofits within that industry. This assumption is more true of highly educated – and 
therefore more specialized – individuals.  For this reason, I focus on highly educated workers for 
the remainder of the paper. 
 
Table 3.2. Baseline specifications split by education group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log(Wage) Log(Wage) Log(Wage) Log(Wage) 
     
Nonprofit -0.00303 -9.20e-05 -0.0959*** -0.0830*** 
 (0.00475) (0.00449) (0.00710) (0.00639) 
Nonprofit X NP share 0.0736*** 0.0764*** 0.209*** 0.192*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0152) (0.0136) 
NP share -0.0668*** -0.0395** -0.0792** -0.116*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0172) (0.0333) (0.0316) 
     
Educ. group Low Low High High 
State FEs X  X  
Super-PUMA FEs  X  X 
     
Observations 564,020 564,020 335,104 335,104 
R-squared 0.340 0.363 0.320 0.335 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at super-PUMA level) in parentheses. All specifications include additional 
controls as noted in the text. 
 
To provide a clearer sense of the impact of within-industry variance in nonprofit share, 
Table 3.3 repeats the estimation of the baseline specification (with super-PUMA FEs and high 
education workers only), but estimating wage gaps for one industry at a time. I focus on a set of 
industries which are prominent in the nonprofit sector and/or are often discussed in the previous 
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literature on nonprofit wage differentials. In the next section, I examine a particular industry 
(nursing homes) in much greater detail. 
We see that, with the exception of the hospital industry, within each of these industries 
the pattern is generally consistent with that of the main results – the nonprofit wage differential is 
initially negative, but shrinks as nonprofit share increases. Moreover, it is not surprising that 
hospitals serve as the exception here given that, unlike the other industries, nonprofit share is 
almost always relatively high within a locality. Thus, the only observations of hospitals in the 
dataset are observations wherein, according to my argument, all available motivated workers 
have been hired.  
 
Table 3.3. Wage gaps within particular industries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Industry: Clinics Hospitals Research/Dev. 
    
Nonprofit -0.0535* 0.0272 -0.234*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0262) (0.0486) 
Nonprofit X NPS 0.236 -0.00275 0.413*** 
 (0.207) (0.0567) (0.145) 
    
Super-PUMA FEs X X X 
    
Observations 13,200 51,024 5,286 
R-squared 0.454 0.286 0.367 
    
 (4) (5) (6) 
Industry: Nursing homes Media Legal services 
    
Nonprofit -0.0700* -0.227*** -0.485*** 
 (0.0400) (0.0330) (0.151) 
Nonprofit X NPS 0.123 0.584* 0.457 
 (0.171) (0.328) (2.373) 
    
Super-PUMA FEs X X X 
    
Observations 6,562 13,141 1,454 
R-squared 0.426 0.330 0.322 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at super-PUMA level) in parentheses. All 
specifications include additional controls as noted in the text. 
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3.6.2.2 Do results vary by “collectiveness” of nonprofits? 
 
In Section 3.3, I offered two potential explanations for labor donations from the literature. On the 
one hand, many nonprofits produce public or collective goods so workers may receive “warm 
glow” from contributing to that process. Elsewhere, as in medical-related industries, nonprofits 
produce essentially the same private goods or services as their for-profit counterparts, but they 
often produce higher quality goods (or have less incentive to deviate from the promised level of 
quality when quality is difficult to monitor.) To borrow Hansmann’s (1980) language, a 
“craftsmanlike” worker – motivated by the craft of the job, rather than solely wages – may prefer 
a nonprofit because of the opportunity to participate in high-quality production.  
Are the preceding results driven by one of these broad categories of nonprofits? To assess 
this, I split the sample using Weisbrod’s index of “collectiveness” (1991). The collectiveness 
index is constructed as the fraction revenue within an industry that comes from public sources 
(private donations and government grants)
34
. Industries with high collectiveness measures 
receive most of their revenue from public sources and are more likely to fall into the first 
category discussed above: nonprofits that produce public or collective goods. Industries with 
lower collectiveness measures rely more on sales for revenue and as such are more similar to for-
profits. Thus, low collectiveness measures are associated with the second broad category: 
industries where non-profits produce similar, but higher quality, goods relative to for-profits. 
I split the sample into a “high” and “low” collectiveness group. An industry is included in 
that “high collectiveness” if its collectiveness measure is higher above the median level of 
collectiveness (and is included in the “low” group otherwise.) Table 3.4 reports the results of the 
main specification from before for each of these groups. While the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients is somewhat depressed in the “low collectiveness” group, we see that the qualitative 
pattern observed in the baseline results holds in both cases. In the “low collectiveness” group, 
nonprofit workers earn 6% less than for-profit workers in low-NPS areas; in the “high 
collectiveness” group, nonprofit workers earn 14% less in low-NPS areas. In both cases, these 
wage gaps are eliminated as nonprofit share increases. 
                                               
34 I used the year 2000 “Core Files” from the National Center for Charitable Statistics to construct each industry’s 
collectiveness measure. The Core Files collect the most essential variables from the universe of nonprofits’ tax 
returns for a given year, which – importantly – includes “total revenue” and “revenue from public sources.” 
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Table 3.4. Wage gaps, sample split by collectiveness 
 (1) (2) 
 Collectiveness: Low Collectiveness: High 
VARIABLES ln(Wage) ln(Wage) 
   
Nonprofit -0.0569*** -0.138*** 
 (0.00930) (0.0106) 
Nonprofit X NP Share 0.174*** 0.245*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0192) 
NP Share -0.146*** -0.0931** 
 (0.0422) (0.0363) 
   
Super-PUMA FEs X X 
   
Observations 151,369 143,295 
R-squared 0.304 0.350 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at super-PUMA level) in parentheses. All 
specifications include additional controls as noted in the text. 
 
3.6.2.3 Are wages equalized when nonprofit share is high? 
 
Finally, while the preceding results document the predicted directional impact of nonprofit share 
on the wage gap, the theoretical predictions are somewhat more precise. When nonprofit share is 
low, we should see a wage gap; this has been documented. As nonprofit share increases, this gap 
should shrink (which is also documented) but – more specifically – nonprofit share should 
eventually reach a point where the wage differential is (a) constant in nonprofit share and (b) 
close to zero. I extend the state-fixed effects specifications and use two methods to assess these 
predictions: (1) a spline regression and (2) a cubic specification, allowing for a nonlinear 
relationship between wages gaps and nonprofit share.  
In the spline regression, I allow the marginal effect of nonprofit share to vary within each 
quartile of nonprofit share. This provides a clearer sense of how the relationship between 
nonprofit share and wages vary across the domain of nonprofit share. Results are reported in 
Table 3.5. Again, we see a nonprofit wage gap of roughly 10% when nonprofit share is close to 
zero. In fact, moving into the (very small) first quartile the wage gap becomes even larger. 
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Consistent with the predictions, as nonprofit share increases (beyond the first quartile) we see 
that the marginal impact of nonprofit share decreases until it is essentially zero in the fourth 
quartile. 
 
Table 3.5. Spline regression estimates of the impact of NP Share by quartile 
 NPS quartile range ln(Wage) 
   
Nonprofit (0) -0.103** 
  (0.0471) 
Nonprofit X NP Share (1st quartile) 0-0.02 -0.702 
  (2.746) 
Nonprofit X NP Share (2nd quartile) 0.02-0.07 1.244*** 
  (0.378) 
Nonprofit X NP Share (3
rd
 quartile) 0.07-0.43 0.199*** 
  (0.0322) 
Nonprofit X NP Share (4th quartile) 0.43-1 -0.0211 
  (0.0395) 
   
Observations  335,104 
R-squared  0.335 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at super-PUMA level) in parentheses. All specifications 
include additional controls as noted in the text. 
  
For the cubic specification, I estimate an extension of the baseline specification: 
 
 
The resulting wage differential is plotted in Figure 3.2, with nonprofit share along the x-
axis and wage differential on the y-axis. With low nonprofit share, highly educated nonprofit 
workers earn roughly 12% less than their for-profit counterparts. However, this differential 
shrinks as nonprofit share increases until nonprofit share reaches a certain point, after which 
there is essentially no difference in wages across the two sectors. Taken together, the spline and 
cubic specifications suggest that (1) wages are equalized when nonprofit share is high and (2) 
beyond that point, the wage gap does not vary with nonprofit share.  
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Figure 3.2. Wage differential as a function of nonprofit share 
 (Shaded area represents 95% confidence interval) 
3.7 NURSING HOME INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
The previous section demonstrates at an economy-wide level that the existence of a nonprofit 
wage differential depends heavily on the nonprofit share of labor. In particular, there exist 
significant negative wage differentials within industries (amongst highly educated workers) in 
localities with relatively low nonprofit share. These differentials are diminished in localities with 
higher nonprofit shares. These results are in line with what we would expect to find based on the 
explanation put forth in the previous section: nonprofit wage differentials exist as long as there 
are enough “motivated” workers available to satisfy labor demand, after which firms must raise 
wages to draw in additional workers.  
However, based on limitations of the Census data, there are several alternative 
explanations for the empirical results that have not been accounted for. Are nonprofit workers in 
low-nonprofit share areas simply lower quality, and their wages reflect this? Are the results 
driven by differences in the competitive environment faced by low-NPS versus high-NPS 
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nonprofits? Alternatively, the results might be driven by differences in government attitudes 
towards nonprofits across localities.  
To address these concerns, I turn to a similar but more detailed analysis of a particular 
industry – namely, the nursing home industry – with much richer data available to better account 
for these issues. I employ a firm-level dataset from the United States Department of Health & 
Human Services that contains information about every nursing home in the country that is 
registered with Medicare or Medicaid, thereby capturing 95% of nursing homes.
35
 In the data, for 
each nursing home I observe: nonprofit/for-profit status, location (street address), number of 
residents, number of beds, total labor hours per resident, and a set of quality measures.  
In addition to the richness of the data, focusing on the nursing home industry is 
interesting in its own right as there have been a number of papers specifically examining wage 
differences across nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes (e.g., Borjas et al. (1983), Holtmann 
and Idson (1993); Ben-ner, Paulson, and Ren (2011)). The general consensus from the literature 
is that, after accounting for the quality of workers, there is little difference between for-profit and 
nonprofit nursing home pay.
36
 Thus, nursing homes provide a strong test for my central claim: 
although there is little evidence of a wage gap in nursing homes on average, accounting for 
nonprofit share may reveal an underlying wage gap that would not otherwise be detected.  
3.7.1 Data 
In the economy-wide analysis, a rough estimate of nonprofit share was constructed from the 
number of nonprofit workers per industry and locality reported in the Census data, which is why 
the relatively large Super-PUMA was used as the main geographic unit. Given exact numbers of 
labor hours used for (almost) the entire universe of nursing homes, here I can construct precise 
nonprofit shares within more appropriate geographic groupings. In particular, the geographic 
concept used in this section is the “commuting zone,” as defined and constructed by Tolbert et al. 
                                               
35 The data is gathered for the department’s Nursing Home Compare website – which is designed to help individuals 
find and becomes informed about nursing homes in their area. The raw data used for this website is freely available 
at http://data.medicare.gov.  
36 Ben-ner, Paulson, and Ren (2011) find little evidence of a wage gap, but some evidence of a higher level of fringe 
benefits in nonprofit nursing homes. 
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(1996). Commuting zones are clusters of counties organized around particular labor markets 
based on information from previous Censuses about individuals’ place of residence and place of 
work. Commuting zones can loosely be thought of as being similar to metropolitan areas, but – 
unlike the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) – they cover the entire country. Thus, in this 
section I construct the nonprofit share within a particular commuting zone (CZ) as: 
 
 
The quality ratings included in the data are constructed by the Department of Health & 
Human Services and are based on safety inspections and a set of ten resident health measures 
(e.g., “Percent of residents with pressure sores.”), which therefore can be interpreted as a 
measure of the quality of output of employees of the nursing home.
37
 These measures are 
reported as “star ratings,” where the maximum possible number of stars is 5. The quality ratings 
also account for the composition of the staff (e.g., number of registered nurses relative to 
licensed practical nurses and nurse aides). However, while safety inspections and health 
measures capture the activity of the workers, the staffing measures only capture who is hired and 
not the effort they provide. Thus, I modify the reported overall measure slightly to strip away the 
variation that stems from staffing measures. (I do, however, control for the staff composition in 
the empirical analysis that follows.)  In particular, the overall measure accounts for staffing in 
the following manner: “Add one star to […] if staffing rating is four or  five stars and greater 
than the health inspection rating; subtract one star if staffing is one star.” I simply reverse this 
process, substracting a star if staffing is four or five and adding a star if the staffing measure is 
one star. 
The nursing home data does not include any information about wages. I pair the nursing 
home data, which I use to construct locality-specific information such as nonprofit share, with 
microdata from the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS asks many of the same 
questions as the Census data used in the economy-wide analysis, but only provides a 1%-sample 
of the United States population. The size of the sample is less critical here though, as I am not 
                                               
37 Detailed descriptions of the construction of these quality ratings can be found at 
http://www.cms.gov/CertificationandComplianc/13_FSQRS.asp 
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relying on this data to construct estimates of nonprofit shares (as was the case in the previous 
section.)   
3.7.2 Empirical approach & baseline results 
The general empirical strategy is the same here as in the previous section. I restrict my sample, 
drawn from the ACS data, to individuals who work in the nursing home industry and, as a 
baseline specification, estimate the same empirical specification as in preceding sections.  
I include the same individual-level controls as before (race, education, the interactions of 
expereince, gender, and marital status), commuting-zone fixed effects (which capture the main 
effect of NPS), and occupation fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-
zone level.  
The results of this baseline specification – essentially replicating the approach from the 
previous section but with a single industry and a better NPS measure – are reported in Column 1 
of Table 3.6.  Again, as before, we find a large and significant negative wage differential when 
nonprofit share is low (as indicated by the “nonprofit” coefficent) that disappears as nonprofit 
share increases (as indicated by the postive & significant “nonprofit X NPS” coefficient.)  
3.7.3 Controlling for market conditions 
Aside from eliminating noise from the NPS measure, the estimation presented in column 1 is 
subject to the same concerns as in the economy-wide data. Thus, in the remaining columns of 
Table 3.6, I attempt to minimize such concerns. In particular, it is possible that the economy-
wide results are driven by differences in the market conditions that low- and high-NPS 
nonprofits face. However, because these preceding results include locality fixed effects (Super-
PUMA fixed effects in the previous section and CZ fixed effects here), “market conditions” can 
only impact the results insofar as they differentially impact the way that nonprofits and for-
profits set wages.  
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.6, I add controls for local market characteristics that were 
not possible to account for in the economy-wide data and – because it is only the differential 
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impact of market conditions on nonprofits’ wage setting that we are concerned about – these 
measures are interacted with whether or not the worker is employed by a nonprofit. All market-
level characteristics are re-centered around their means so that we can still interpret the 
“Nonprofit” coefficient as the wage gap when non-profit share is zero and all other locality 
characteristics are at their mean.   
 
Table 3.6. Nonprofit wage gaps in nursing homes with market-level controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ln(Wage) ln(Wage) ln(Wage) 
    
Nonprofit -0.173*** -0.186*** -0.175*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0635) (0.0543) 
Nonprofit X NPS 0.386*** 0.418** 0.389*** 
 (0.141) (0.180) (0.144) 
Nonprofit X (# of residents)  2.77e-07  
  (2.58e-06)  
Nonprofit X (# of for-prof. firms)  -0.000194  
  (0.00128)  
Nonprofit X (# of non-prof. firms)  0.000139  
  (0.000296)  
Nonprofit X HHI   -0.135 
   (1.131) 
Constant 4.222*** 4.219*** 4.222*** 
 (0.280) (0.282) (0.280) 
    
Observations 2,082 2,082 2,082 
R-squared 0.506 0.506 0.506 
Robust standard errors (clustered at commuting zone level) in parentheses. All specifications include additional 
controls as noted in the text. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In column 2 I control for directly observable measures: number of nursing-home residents in the 
CZ, number of for-profit nursing homes in the CZ, and number of nonprofit nursing homes in the 
CZ. These measures control for the general size of the market but also loosely account for the 
relative market concentrations of nonprofits and for-profits. For instance, it is possible for 
nonprofit share to be high either because there is one large nonprofit nursing home or many 
small nonprofit nursing homes. This difference of course would not be picked up by NPS alone, 
but could impact wage-setting. Similarly, in column 3, these measures are summarized into a 
single constructed variable: the Herfindahl-Hischmann Index for nursing homes within the CZ.  
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In both columns 2 and 3, we see that these market characteristics do not significantly 
differentially impact the wages of nonprofit workers. (They presumably impact wages generally 
but, again, any general effect is captured by the CZ fixed effects.) More importantly, we see that, 
even accounting for these characteristics, the general result from the baseline model holds: a 
significant and negative “nonprofit” coefficient paired with a significant and positive “nonprofit 
X NPS” coefficient. 
3.7.4 Endogeneity of nonprofit share 
There is a concern that nonprofit share and the wage differential are endogeneous. In particular, 
if a state or local government provides conditions which reduce costs for nonprofits to a greater 
degree than elsewhere, then nonprofits may have more funds available to pay workers. At the 
same time, a generally more nonprofit-friendly environment is also likely to increase nonprofit 
share. To attempt to address this, I use a two-stage least squares instrumental variables approach, 
taking an instrument for nonprofit share that has been used in previous literature (Grabowski & 
Hirth, 2003; Sloan et al., 2001). In particular, I instrument for NPS using the growth in the 
elderly population (ages 65 and above) in the first half of the decade, from 2001-2006. As 
Grabowski and Hirth (2003) discuss, for-profit nursing homes face lower start-up costs and can 
more quickly react to demand. Thus, a locality with higher recent growth in elderly population is 
likely to have a lower nonprofit share for reasons unrelated to local government’s preferences 
towards nonprofits.  
The results of this estimation are displayed in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.7. The 
empirical specification includes all of the controls employed in the baseline results reported in 
Table 3.6. Column 1 reports the first stage result: as expected, a growth in the elderly population 
decreases nonprofit share. Column 2 reports the second stage. The result from the preceding 
section survives (and, in fact, is stronger.) 
The growth in elderly population represents an increase in demand for nursing homes 
generally, rather than a differential increase in demand for nonprofits. Because we are interested 
in the differential impact that nonprofit share has on nonprofit wages, the elderly population 
instrument plausibly satisfies the exclusion restriction.  
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However, differential changes in demand for nonprofit nursing homes in particular 
present an additional potential source of endogeneity. If demand for nonprofit nursing home 
services increases in a particular locality (perhaps because nonprofit nursing homes are expected 
to provide higher quality), demand for labor in nonprofit nursing homes would increase as well. 
Thus, we might expect an increase in both nonprofit share and wages. I use a second 
instrumental variable to address this concern: ten-year lagged nonprofit share in unrelated 
industries within the same locality. The set of “unrelated industries” excludes any medical-
related industry. Lagged unrelated-NPS caputres the fact that a locality may have had nonprofit-
friendly policies in the past which attracted nonprofits, thus setting in place a nonprofit share that 
is determined independent of demand for nonprofit nursing homes. Results are reported in 
columns 3 and 4. Column 3 reports the first stage: higher lagged, unrelated NPS is associated 
with higher nursing home NPS. Column 4 reports the second stage estimates. Again, we observe 
wage gaps in low nonprofit share areas that are eliminated as nonprofit share increases. 
 
Table 3.7. Two-stage least squares estimates to account for endogeneity of nonprofit share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 IV: Growth in elderly population IV: Lagged unrelated-industry NPS 
VARIABLES First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
     
Nonprofit  -0.352**  -0.298*** 
  (0.163)  (0.101) 
Nonprofit X NPS  0.996*  0.812** 
  (0.558)  (0.339) 
Instrument -0.708***  3.081***  
 (0.247)  (0.687)  
     
Observations 2,084 2,084 2,084 2,084 
R-squared 0.890 0.503 0.903 0.505 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at commuting zone level) in parentheses. All specifications include 
additional controls as noted in the text. 
 
3.7.5 Quality of work in nonprofits 
Finally, an important concern in the economy-wide anaylsis is the possibility that, in localities 
with low nonprofit share, nonprofit workers are less productive and the negative wage 
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differential simply reflected this quality differential. The simple model in Section 3.4 predicts 
just the opposite. In this section, I take advantage of the nursing home five-star quality measures 
constructed by the Department of Health & Human Services and assess the quality of a nursing 
home’s output as a function of their nonprofit status and the nonprofit share in their locality. That 
is, taking a nursing home as the unit of observation, I estimate the same specification as before 
but I take the quality measure as the dependent variable. As in previous regressions, I include 
commuting zone fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the commuting zone level. In one 
specification, I include firm-level controls: the nursing home’s share of their market, registered 
nurse (RN) labor hours per resident, licensed practical nurse (LPN) labor hours per resident, 
other staff hours per resident, total residents, and ratio of total residents to total beds.  
 
Table 3.8. Quality differentials as a function of nonprofit share 
 (1) (2) 
   
Nonprofit 0.712*** 0.386*** 
 (0.0820) (0.0819) 
Nonprofit X NPS -0.797*** -0.398* 
 (0.236) (0.221) 
Firm market share  -1.413 
  (0.915) 
RN Hours/resident  0.231*** 
  (0.0289) 
LPN Hours/resident  -0.116*** 
  (0.0414) 
CNA Hours/resident  0.162*** 
  (0.0315) 
Residents  -0.004*** 
  (0.001) 
Fraction of beds occupied  1.916*** 
  (0.114) 
Constant 2.664*** 1.147*** 
 (0.0120) (0.138) 
   
Observations 13,393 13,089 
R-squared 0.117 0.182 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at commuting zone level) in parentheses.  
 
If the previous results were in fact driven by less productive workers in low-NPS areas, 
we would expect to see a similar pattern amongst these coefficients as we have observed in 
previous results: the “nonprofit” coefficient would be significantly negative while “nonprofit X 
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NPS” would be significantly positive. However, as can be seen in Table 3.8, we observe just the 
opposite; quality at nonprofits is significantly higher quality when nonprofit share is low and 
decreases amongst nonprofits in higher nonprofit share areas. That is, it is precisely the areas 
where nonprofit nursing home pay is lowest that nonprofit quality is highest, and as nonprofit 
share increases (and nonprofit pay increases) the quality of output at nonprofits moves closer to 
that of for-profits. This is consistent with a model – such as the motivation-screening model 
presented in Section 3.4 – wherein lower wages in nonprofits draw in workers who are willing to 
put forth greater effort than is required of them. 
3.8 DO NONPROFITS IN LOW NONPROFIT SHARE AREAS ATTRACT A 
DIFFERENT “TYPE” OF WORKER?   
Two main results emerge from the preceding sections of the paper: 
1. At the labor market level, wage gaps are largest in low nonprofit share areas. 
2. At the firm level, nonprofit nursing home output is highest in low nonprofit share areas. 
These results are consistent with the suggestion that a wage gap serves as a motivation-screening 
device and, as a result, a specific type of worker is attracted to nonprofits in low nonprofit share 
areas. However, the preceding results do not provide direct evidence that motivation-based 
sorting is the mechanism driving the results. That is, due to data limitations, I provide no 
evidence that low-NPS nonprofit workers are observationally different than high-NPS nonprofit 
workers in ways that might suggest that they are more likely to be “motivated types.” Using 
much richer worker-level data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), I 
provide suggestive evidence to fill this gap. I also take advantage of the NLSY to address 
alternative explanations remaining from previous sections. 
As proxies for “motivation,” I focus on two measures available in the NLSY: job 
satisfaction and prosocial activities (volunteering and donating). The interest in these two 
measures is generated by existing findings. Benz (2005) documents higher average job 
satisfaction amongst nonprofit employees. This could be due to characteristics of the work 
environment, in which case all workers benefit, or it could be an indication of higher utility 
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“donating labor,” in which case only “motivated” workers benefit. Thus, if the preceding results 
are indeed driven by more “standard” workers sorting into nonprofits as nonprofit share 
increases, then job satisfaction should be particularly high where nonprofit share is low (and only 
motivated workers are present.) Satisfaction should diminish in higher nonprofit share areas.  
Similarly, previous researchers have found that nonprofit workers are in general more 
likely to donate or volunteer (Houston, 2006; Serra et al., 2011), which some take as an indicator 
of “public service motivation.” As with job satisfaction, there are multiple possible explanations 
for a higher propensity to engage in prosocial activities. For instance, it is possible that nonprofit 
workers simply have more access to or information about donation/volunteering opportunities. If 
this were the only explanation, then we would expect no relationship between likelihood of 
engaging in prosocial activities and nonprofit share. However, if this increased likelihood were 
indeed an indication that some nonprofit workers are “motivated types,” then here we would 
expect this result to be particularly strong amongst low nonprofit share workers.  
3.8.1 Data & empirical approach 
The data used in this section is drawn from the 2000 to 2010 waves of the 1997 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The NLSY surveys a panel of individuals yearly. By 
2000, respondents were between the ages of 15 and 19. By 2010, respondents were between the 
ages of 25 and 29. (Because I restrict the sample to workers with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
as in the rest of the paper, in reality the first observations are in 2002.) Thus, the sample consists 
of workers just sorting into nonprofit or for-profit jobs for the first time. This is ideal as the 
theoretical predictions speak to the impact of this job-choice decision (as opposed to, for 
instance, evolution of wages once employed.) 
Relative to data sources used elsewhere in this paper, the NLSY includes relatively few 
observations and therefore very few observations of nonprofit workers. Pooling data from all of 
the waves between 2000 and 2010, there are 3,608 observations of employed, “highly educated” 
workers. Of these, 473 report working in a nonprofit. As a result, although the NLSY is a panel, I 
analyze the data as pooled cross-sections. In all specifications, I cluster standard errors at the 
individual level to account for multiple observations of each respondent.   
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I use the confidential geocoded version of the NLSY97 to identify respondents’ county of 
residence, which I then map into Super-PUMAs to assign each worker a nonprofit share based on 
his or her industry and Super-PUMA. The construction of nonprofit share is identical to the 
procedure used in Section 3.6, with the exception that nonprofit share is required for every year 
between 2000 and 2010. As before, I use the 2000 5%-sample of Census microdata for 2000 
nonprofit shares. I also construct nonprofit shares for 2006 and 2009 using pooled 3%-samples 
of American Community Survey data.
38
 For all the remaining years of the decade, I linearly 
interpolate between 2000, 2006, and 2009 to construct industry/locality-specific nonprofit shares 
for each year.  
Despite the small number of I observations, I turn to the NLSY because it includes a 
much richer set of worker-level variables than the data sources used in preceding sections. As 
proxies for “motivation,” I focus on two measures available in the NLSY: job satisfaction and 
prosocial activities. I collapse the five-point scale job satisfaction responses into a binary 
variable. My constructed variable, Satisfied, is equal to one if respondents indicate that they like 
their jobs “very much” or “fairly well.” Satisfied is equal to zero if respondents indicate that they 
neither like nor dislike their job or express negative feelings. As a measure of prosocial 
activities, I use responses from the 2005 and 2007 waves. In these two waves, respondents were 
asked whether they engaged in any volunteering or made any donations in the preceding year. I 
construct a binary variable, Prosocial, equal to one if respondents answer yes to either of these 
questions.
39
 
I attempt to match the basic empirical specifications used in previous sections. I regress 
the outcome variable of interest (log of wage, satisfaction, or prosocial activities) on a dummy 
for nonprofit, nonprofit share (NPS), and the interaction of nonprofit and NPS. I also include 
controls that match those used in previous sections: gender, race, age, marital status, and highest 
degree received. Unlike in the previous data, I can control for actual experience in the labor 
market as the NLSY reports the total number of weeks an individual has worked since the age of 
                                               
38 These data were obtained from ipums.org. 2006 is the first year that a pooled 3% sample is available. The “pooled 
samples” pool three years worth of 1% samples. The 2006 sample, for instance, pools the 2005, 2006, and 2007 1% 
ACS samples.  
39 Respondents who report engaging in volunteer work are also asked whether the volunteer work was truly 
voluntary and not, for instance, court-ordered. I only count an individual as having volunteered if they engaged in 
voluntary volunteering. 
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20 and tenure with their current employer. Because of the limited number of observations, there 
are far fewer individuals in any given industry, occupation, or location. I therefore use broader 
fixed effects for each of these than in previous sections. For location, I employ state fixed 
effects. For industry and occupation, I collapse the three-digit codes into the broader categories 
listed by IPUMS.
40
 However, results are generally consistent when using more detailed industry, 
occupation, and location fixed effects. 
3.8.2 Results 
I begin by demonstrating that the main wage gap result from the preceding section holds in this 
sample and is robust to additional controls available in the NLSY. Table 3.9 reports results, 
taking (log of) wage as the dependent variable. Model 1 is the baseline specification, employing 
controls noted above. As in Sections 6 and 7, nonprofit workers in low nonprofit share areas earn 
significantly less than comparable for-profit workers, but this wage gap is eliminated as 
nonprofit share increases. With the richness of the NLSY data, we can extend this baseline 
specification to rule out additional alternative explanations. Model 2 adds controls for 
respondents’ ASVAB scores, which is commonly used in the literature as a measure of cognitive 
ability. The results are essentially unchanged.  
Model 3 adds to the baseline specification a set of dummy variables indicating which 
benefits the respondent’s employer provides (e.g., medical insurance, flexible work schedule, 
etc.). Model 4 adds to the baseline specification a control for the number of other people that 
work for the same employer as the respondent. Existing empirical work finds that workers in 
large firms earn higher wages (e.g., Troske (1999)). If market-level nonprofit share is correlated 
with size of nonprofit firms, then this could present an alternative explanation for preceding 
results.
41
 Responses to questions about benefits and  “number of employees” are not available for 
all respondents (explaining the changing number of observations), so the sample in Models 3 and 
                                               
40 For instance, all mining-related industries (coal mining, metal mining, etc.) are collapsed into one broader 
“mining” category. See: http://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/IND1990#codes_tab and http://usa.ipums.org/usa-
action/variables/OCC1990#codes_tab for industry groupings. 
41 I can also address this concern by adding a control for the market-level average size of nonprofit and for-profit 
nursing homes in Section 7. I do not report the results, but adding such a control does not impact the results. 
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4 slightly differ from the sample in Models 1 and 2. Nonetheless, the main result holds after 
adding these controls; the results do not appear to be explained by differences in benefits or the 
large-firm wage premium. 
 
Table 3.9. Estimating wage gaps in the NLSY97 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Baseline Control for ability Control for benefits Control for number 
of employees 
     
Nonprofit -0.419*** -0.412*** -0.379** -0.255* 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.153) (0.147) 
Nonprofit X NPS 0.861*** 0.837*** 0.526 0.408 
 (0.300) (0.301) (0.326) (0.324) 
NPS -0.504** -0.504** -0.174 -0.0781 
 (0.202) (0.203) (0.238) (0.240) 
     
Observations 865 865 621 538 
R-squared 0.332 0.335 0.476 0.465 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at individual-level) in parentheses.  
All specifications include controls as noted in text. 
 
Having established that the main result holds amongst NLSY97 respondents, we now 
turn to differences in job satisfaction and prosocial activities. Results, taking these two measures 
as dependent variables, are reported in Table 3.10. Low-NPS nonprofit workers are significantly 
more likely to report that they enjoy their job (Column 1) and are also more likely to report 
engaging in prosocial activities (Column 2). These results are diminished as nonprofit share 
increases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
Table 3.10. Differences in proxies for motivation as a function of nonprofit share 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Satisfied Prosocial 
   
Nonprofit 0.225** 0.575*** 
 (0.0895) (0.213) 
Nonprofit X NPS -0.251 -0.497 
 (0.217) (0.497) 
NPS 0.0124 0.681 
 (0.201) (0.446) 
Constant 0.479 1.317 
 (0.524) (1.148) 
   
Observations 715 274 
R-squared 0.223 0.459 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at individual-level) in parentheses. All 
specifications include controls as noted in text. 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
Existing research attempts to determine whether the nonprofit wage gap is driven by some 
workers’ willingness to accept lower wages (the “labor donation hypothesis”) or by the 
composition of jobs in the nonprofit sector. Most researchers either look within a particular 
industry where we can be confident that jobs are relatively similar or employ detailed controls 
for industry, occupation, etc. This has led to inconsistent results: clear wage gaps exist in some 
industries but not others. The existence of a wage gap is taken as evidence of the labor donation 
hypothesis; the absence of a wage gap is often taken as evidence against labor donations.  
I contribute to this literature by asking: assuming some workers are willing to “donate 
their labor,” when should we expect to see a wage gap? I build on a point made by Preston in 
1989; even when some workers are willing to donate their labor, in order for a wage differential 
to exist, it must be in firms’ interests to maintain low wages. Once the number of workers 
demanded by nonprofits exceeds the number of “motivated” workers, firms must raise their 
wages. This, then yields the prediction that the existence of a nonprofit wage differential within a 
particular industry depends on how much labor nonprofits demand relative to for-profits, with 
wage differentials existing only in industries with relatively low nonprofit shares of labor.  
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I provide empirical evidence consistent with this suggestion. To avoid making 
comparisons across industries, I examine nonprofit wage differentials as a function of nonprofit 
share within industries but across localities, first through a detailed set of industry fixed-effects 
in an economy-wide analysis and then by examining the nursing home industry in more detail. 
Throughout, it is indeed the case that wage differentials exist when nonprofit share is low (and 
firms are able to draw in motivated workers) that then disappear as nonprofit share increase (with 
firms required to draw in standard workers.) Using a detailed firm-level dataset that encompasses 
95% of nursing homes within the United States, I provide evidence that suggests that these 
results are not driven by differences in competitive environments or endogeneity of nonprofit 
share and nonprofit wages. I also show that in the nursing home industry, the quality of nonprofit 
work is highest when nonprofit share is low and decreases as nonprofit share increases. This 
result is striking as it demonstrates that the nonprofit workers being paid the least (relative to 
their for-profit counterparts) are also the workers who are producing the highest quality work. 
Moreover, using NLSY data, I show that nonprofit workers facing the largest wage gaps are also 
most likely to report enjoying their job. 
Thus, empirically, there is clear evidence that the existence of nonprofit wage 
differentials depends on nonprofit share. This systematic relationship helps organize some of the 
divergent results in the existing literature on nonprofit wages. It had been established, for 
instance, that nonprofit workers in legal services earn less than for-profit workers, but workers in 
the hospital industry are not penalized for choosing a non-profit job. Within the framework of 
this paper, this is unsurprising: nonprofit share in legal services is very low, while nonprofit 
share in hospitals is very high.   
Beyond this empirical regularity, the relationship wage gap and nonprofit share is 
consistent with the argument that when nonprofit labor demand is relatively low, nonprofits can 
maintain low wages and rely on “motivated” workers. As nonprofits’ labor demand grows, they 
are forced to attract standard workers as well and must raise their wages to attract them. The 
observed pattern of wage gaps as a function of nonprofit share provides indirect evidence of this 
motivation-sorting and screening mechanism. The results I present on firm-level quality, worker-
level job satisfaction, and worker-level prosocial activities provide more direct evidence that a 
different “type” of worker is indeed sorting into nonprofits when wage gaps are large.  
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This paper therefore provides empirical support for recent theoretical work on sorting and 
screening of “motivated workers” in the labor market (Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Heyes, 2005; 
Delfgaauw & Dur, 2007; Ghatak & Mueller, 2011), which applies to not just the nonprofit 
sector, but also teaching, nursing, or any other job where workers might claim that they are “not 
in it for the money.” I show that the sorting of motivated workers into jobs that they “care about” 
can have important and economically significant implications for labor market outcomes. My 
results suggest that raising wages may not always be a clear solution to attracting more 
productive workers (an idea suggested in recent theoretical work (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010)), as I 
find that quality of output is highest in nonprofit nursing homes precisely when nonprofit wages 
are lowest relative to for-profits. This echoes recent empirical evidence that higher pay for 
politicians – another occupation where “mission-oriented motivation” may be important – 
reduces politician quality (Fisman et al., 2012). Perhaps more importantly, I build on the 
theoretical literature on motivated labor by demonstrating that – in practice – the impact of 
motivation in the labor market depends heavily on both the supply and demand sides of the 
market.  
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4.0  WALLFLOWERS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF REPUTATION 
AVOIDANCE (WITH SERA LINARDI) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
How is prosocial behavior impacted by visibility? Given the frequency with which charitable 
contributions are rewarded with public recognition – be it through a listing of donors in a 
monthly newsletter or the naming of a building in a donor’s honor – fundraisers seem to believe 
that visibility has a positive effect. The majority of current research seems to support the 
hypothesis that visibility should increase giving due to a desire to acquire a positive reputation
42
 
-- that is, appearing altruistic to others (Benabou & Tirole, 2006). For instance, Andreoni and 
Petrie (2004) and Rege and Telle (2004) find that visibility increases voluntary contributions to a 
public good.
43
 However, there is evidence to the contrary: Noussair and Tucker (2007) find that 
visibility decreases giving in a repeated public goods game. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) find 
that visibility decreases giving in a dictator game. Shi (2011) finds that visibility decreases 
participants’ willingness to donate blood. Others have found that the success of visibility 
depends heavily on the context or nature of the decisions being made (Alpizar et al., 2008; 
Gachter & Fehr, 1999; Noussair & Tucker, 2007; Soetevent, 2005).
44
 If the desire to appear 
                                               
42 Throughout the paper, “reputation” refers to intrinsic reputation concerns as opposed to strategic reputation 
concerns.  For agents in our paper (as in Benabou & Tirole, 2006), others’ perception of them directly enters their 
utility function and therefore impacts behavior in a one-shot game. This is distinct from strategic reputation concerns 
that arise in repeated games. It is worth noting that a number of papers have focused on sustaining cooperation in 
repeated games through strategic reputation concerns and “indirect reciprocity” (e.g., Milinski & Wedekind, 2000; 
Seinen & Schram, 2001; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002; Bolton et al., 2005). 
43 See Bekkers and Wiepking (2010) for a review of research from psychology and economics. 
44 Gachter and Fehr (1999) find that contributions to a public good increase with visibility when 
contributors meet and interact beforehand, but not otherwise. Soetevent (2005) in a field experiment manipulates the 
visibility of church donations and finds a positive impact for external causes but no impact of internal fundraising. In 
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altruistic were a general and accurate description of individuals’ preferences, we would expect to 
find that visibility increases prosocial behavior more consistently.   
In this paper, we propose and provide evidence of a different type of response to 
visibility: reputation avoidance. In particular, we hypothesize that some individuals are 
“wallflower” types, who are averse to standing out either in a negative way or positive way. Why 
would people be averse to positive reputation? Benabou and Tirole discuss the possibility that 
incentives for prosocial behavior might not work if people are suspected of being motivated by 
incentives.
45
 There is a wealth of evidence showing that monetary incentives reduce prosocial 
behavior when visible; mixed evidence on the impact of visibility may suggest that this is true 
for reputation incentives as well. More generally, there is evidence that people are sometimes 
punished for being “too good”. In the context of laboratory public goods games, individuals are 
willing to punish contributions that are too low or too high (Herrmann, Thoni, & Gachter, 
2008).
46
 There is also theoretical precedence for the idea that individuals react to scrutiny by 
avoiding extreme actions: in Bernheim’s model of conformity (1994) “extremists are esteemed 
less than centrists.” Similarly, our model of wallflower preferences predicts that individuals 
move towards an action that signals they are average in their level of altruism. This forms a close 
relationship between the impact of visibility and individuals’ beliefs about what others will do or 
have done. If a donor believes (or observes) that the “average” individual gives a high (low) 
amount, then by moving towards that average type visibility may have a positive (negative) 
impact.  
Some existing work is suggestive of wallflower behavior. Linardi and McConnell (2011) 
find that subjects are more likely to quit volunteering for a nonprofit when they recently 
observed another subject leaving when highly visible. Peacey and Sanders (2012) study the 
decision to make a donation anonymously and find that individuals who choose extreme low or 
high donations are more likely to conceal their identity.  
                                                                                                                                                       
an experiment at a national park, Alpizar et al. (2008) finds that allowing solicitors to directly view visitors’ 
donation only increases giving when donors received a small gift and not otherwise. Noussair and Tucker (2007) 
find that visibility decreases contributions in a repeated public goods game.  
45 In BT model where honor is positive, reputation incentives would never backfire (reduce giving). It will just cease 
to become effective. In our model of wallflower preferences where honor is negative,  reputation incentives can 
backfire.  
46 Outside of prosocial behavior, trying too hard or performing well in school is sometimes greeted by disapproval 
by peers as is the case, for instance, in the much-discussed “acting white” phenomenon (Austen-Smith & Fryer, 
2005). 
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To more directly identify wallflower behavior in our experiment, we exogenously 
manipulate both visibility and social information to study how individuals react to information 
high and low levels of giving. Participants are assigned to anonymous groups of three. In the first 
stage, participants decide how much to contribute to a charitable cause. Participants in the 
Baseline treatment are informed that their donations will be submitted in a sealed envelope at the 
end of the experiment. Participants in the Visibility treatment are told that their group will submit 
their donations in front of one another. In the second stage, participants are given an opportunity 
to change their donation by conditioning their contribution on every possible combination of the 
other two group members’ donations. We find support for our predictions: participants in the 
Visibility treatment are more likely to condition their donations to fall within the range of their 
group members’ contribution, thus avoiding standing out in a negative or positive way. As a 
result, visibility only has a positive impact when group members’ contributions are high. 
We also test for heterogeneous responses to visibility by examining differences in 
behavior according to familiarity with the cause and gender. Existing work suggests that (1) 
social information primarily impacts the donations of individuals who do not have prior 
experience with the organization (Shang & Croson, 2009) and (2) that “the social preferences of 
women are more situationally specific than those of men” (Croson and Gneezy, 2009).47  Our 
main result – that visibility increases the frequency of contributions that fall between the range of 
others’ donations– is indeed driven by women and individuals unfamiliar with the charitable 
cause. Visibility has an additional effect of compressing females’ unconditional giving around 
their beliefs about average giving, suggesting that “wallflower” reputation preferences may be 
particularly strong among females.  
We test the generalizability of our result in a small-scale field experiment; we find 
additional evidence of wallflower behavior, particularly amongst women. In the field 
experiment, participants perform real effort tasks to raise funds. Here, the modal giving is low. 
We find that women, when visible, match what they observe others give and as a result give less 
in this context.  
                                               
47 See Zetland and Della Giusta (2011), Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008), Lacetera and Macis (2010). 
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4.2 MODEL 
In this section, we contrast the predictions of Benabou & Tirole’s model of prosocial behavior -- 
which assumes that individuals seek positive reputation -- with our modification thereof, wherein 
individuals avoid any form of reputation. We will refer to these reputation-avoiding types as 
“wallflowers.” Here, we merely discuss the assumptions and predictions of the model. 
In Benabou & Tirole’s (2006) (hereafter BT) model of prosocial behavior, agents are 
intrinsically motivated to be prosocial but are also concerned about what their actions imply 
about their level of altruism. They experience positive utility when their actions signal that their 
type is above average (honor) and negative utility when their type is below average (stigma). We 
extend this widely used model of reputation concerns by 1) linking it explicitly to social 
information, and 2) exploring the consequence of allowing individuals to desire neither honor 
nor stigma.   
4.2.1 Basic model 
Let an individual's intrinsic altruism be represented vi ~ u[0,A]. Assume that individuals choose 
between N+1 discrete contribution levels ai  {0,1,2,…,N} with cost function C(ai) where 
C’(ai)>0 and C’’(ai)>0.
48
 Following BT, let viai represents the intrinsic benefit of prosocial 
behavior for a person with altruism vi who contributed ai. Let x {0,1} denote whether or not the 
individual’s decision (and identity) is publicly observable.  
Following BT, the basic components of utility considered in prosocial decisions are 
intrinsic benefit, cost of action, and reputational benefits:  
 
                           
 
                                               
48 Because any portion of the endowment that is not contributed is consumed, this assumption can also be viewed as 
decreasing marginal benefit of consumption. 
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where       represents the reputational benefits associated with choosing    when x>0. For 
individuals with standard BT preferences (who we refer to as reputation-seeking types from here 
on): 
 
                   
 
That is, the reputation a reputation-seeking type obtains from choosing an action is 
dictated (a) by the altruism type v that can be inferred from the action and (b) how distant that 
type is from the average altruism type (E(v)). Note that, in either case,       is positive when 
             and negative otherwise. 
For individuals with wallflower preferences: 
 
                      
 
That is, any action that leads others to assume that the agent’s type         is different than the 
average type      reduces the agent’s utility.  
Define the marginal benefit of reputation in moving from a-1 to a as           
      . For reputation-seeking types, this is equal to                           
                    . Because                   (higher altruism types are 
expected to choose higher actions), the marginal reputation of a higher contribution is always 
positive. This is not true for wallflowers. For wallflowers, marginal reputation is negative if 
             and positive if             . That is, moving closer to the average type – 
from above or below – increases utility.  
 
In summary, these preferences imply:  
1. Wallflowers and reputation-seeking types behave the same in the absence of visibility. 
2. Reputation-seeking types: Visibility increase prosocial behavior. This is because the 
marginal benefit of reputation is always positive. 
3. Wallflower types: Visibility increases a wallflower’s likelihood of choosing the action 
taken by the average altruism type and decreases the likelihood of choosing an extremely 
high or low action. 
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4.2.2 Incorporating social information 
In some situations (as in the second phase of our laboratory experiment), an individual receives 
information about the actions of others who faced the same choice before making her own 
decision. We will refer to this as social information and denote it with s. If this social 
information is publicly available when the individual’s decision is revealed, it is likely that s will 
affect whether the individual’s contribution is perceived as “high” or “low” by others. The 
salient “average type” is no longer the average altruist in the population      but          
First note that if no social information is received, an individual’s expectation of the 
average altruism type is simply the population average: E(v)=A/2. Now suppose that (as in our 
laboratory experiment) an individual observes that actions of two other individuals j and k, in 
other words, s=(      . Given this social information,                      . Reputation 
concerns are                          or                             for 
reputation-seekers and wallflowers, respectively. Note that the utility function is unchanged 
otherwise; this implies that social information has no impact when decisions are not visible. We 
will discuss an alternative model where social information matters without visibility in the 
Extensions subsection below.  
For reputation seekers, marginal reputation benefits remain the same as they were 
without social information:                         On the other hand, marginal 
reputation benefits for reputation avoiders now depend heavily on social information. In 
particular          for   that is higher than    and   . As a result, visibility will drive 
wallflowers to decrease their contribution when they are told that others gave little.   
4.2.3 Testable prediction 
Wallflower preferences imply that individuals avoid low or high contributions and seek out 
contributions within the range of the social information they observe. That is: 
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Prediction: Suppose person i is given information about person j and k’s contributions (   and 
  where   >  ) before choosing his own contribution   . Revealing    will increase       
      . 
 
Again, this prediction differs from what would be observed among reputation seekers. 
Since visibility leads to higher contributions for reputation-seeking types, revealing    will 
increase          . 
4.3 LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
We now turn to the design and results of our laboratory experiment. To test the implications of 
our model, it would be ideal to manipulate participants’ beliefs about the average level of giving 
in a charitable giving task and test whether the impact of visibility is increasingly positive 
(negative) depending on how high (low) others’ giving is. However, directly manipulating 
beliefs in the laboratory is not a straightforward task. We therefore assign subjects to groups and 
use the strategy method to elicit subjects’ giving strategy conditional on the contributions of 
their group members who, in one of the treatments, will observe what they gave.
49
 By doing so, 
we are able to observe what a particular subject would choose to do under a variety of social 
information contexts. In using the strategy method, we essentially test the impact of 
(hypothetical) social information at a within- rather than between-subject level. 
 
                                               
49 The conditional contribution elicitation is based on the design of Fischbacher et al. (2001), but with some 
important differences. Fischbacher et al. allow participants to condition on the mean of their group members’ 
contributions whereas we allow participants to condition on every possible combination of group members’ 
contributions. 
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4.3.1 Experimental Design 
Subjects were recruited through the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL) 
database. In each session, fifteen subjects were seated at computer terminals upon arrival and 
randomly assigned to groups of three and identified only by anonymous subject IDs. We 
explained that the experiment would consist of a “giving task,” during which they would have 
the opportunity to donate to a charitable cause, and a “guessing task,” during which they would 
have the opportunity to earn “up to an additional $7.”  
The software then played a slideshow of a water project in Tingo Pucara, Ecuador, 
organized by Engineers Without Borders (EWB) Pittsburgh, our partner nonprofit for the 
laboratory experiment. After the slide show, we endowed participants with 10 one-dollar bills in 
an envelope, from which they would make their contributions. Any money that participants did 
not donate was theirs’ to keep. 
There are two treatments: Control and Visibility. The only difference between these two 
treatments is that Visibility treatment subjects know that their identity will be revealed to their 
group members and the experimenter after all decisions have been made.  
In the control treatment, the experimenter read from the following script: 
 
“At the end of today's session, you will leave your donation in its original envelope on 
your desk.  The software will inform you of your group’s total donation to Tingo 
Pucara.”  
 
In the visibility treatment, the experimenter read from the following script: 
 
“At the end of today's session, you and your group will sit down together around a table 
to submit your contributions. You will go to a different room with the experimenter who 
will then collect each group member's contributions, announce how much each person 
gave, and announce the total donation to Tingo Pucara. Your group members are the 
only participants who will observe how much you chose to give.”  
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After these preliminaries were completed, the decision-making portion of the experiment 
consisted of three phases: (1) unconditional contributions, (2) conditional contributions, and (3) 
belief elicitation. These decision tasks are explained in detail below. Participants did not learn of 
the details of any of these phases until they occurred nor were participants aware that the “giving 
task” would ultimately consist of both an unconditional and conditional contribution task.    
We conducted five sessions of each of the two treatments with 15 participants per 
session. There were (roughly) equal proportions of males and females in all ten sessions, with 75 
males and 75 females participating overall. All sessions were conducted in the Pittsburgh 
Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL) using z-Tree software. Subjects received a $5 
show-up fee in addition to any money kept or earned during the experiment. Sessions lasted less 
than one hour.   
In the unconditional contribution task, participants were simply asked to indicate how 
much of their $10 endowment they wanted to donate. We restricted contributions to multiples of 
2; that is, participants could choose to give $0, $2, $4, $6, $8, or $10. This restriction and the 
small group sizes were chosen to limit the number of choices that participants would face in the 
conditional contribution task. 
In the conditional contribution task, participants were given the opportunity to change 
their contribution based on what the other two members of their group chose. Participants choose 
contributions conditional on every possible combination of their group members’ contributions 
from the unconditional phase – a total of 21 decisions. For instance, in the first screen (Figure 
4.1), a subject is asked to assume that one of their group members gave $0 in the unconditional 
phase. A list of all possible unconditional contributions of the second member of their group ($0, 
$2, $4, $6, $8 and $10) is displayed, and the subject is asked to indicate her donation for each 
combination of hypothetical contributions. A similar series of screens then follows. In the second 
screen, subjects are asked to assume one group member gave $2 and to then indicate how she 
would contribute if the second group member gave $2, $4, $6, $8, or $10.  The following screens 
present the rest of the scenarios, fixing one group member’s contribution at $4, $6, $8 and $10.  
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Figure 4.1. Conditional contribution entry 
 
As in the conditional contribution design of Fischbacher et al. (2001), one member of 
each group was randomly selected at the end of the session to have her conditional contribution 
implemented. Thus, when participants submitted their contributions at the end of the experiment, 
two members of each group submitted the contribution they chose in the unconditional phase and 
the remaining member submitted the relevant conditional contribution. Even in the visibility 
treatment, participants never learned which member of their group was randomly selected to 
have his or her conditional contribution implemented. 
In the belief elicitation task, participants were asked to guess the number of people who 
chose each of the possible unconditional contributions. Participants were informed that they had 
14 tokens (one for each of the other participants in the room) to allocate across the possible 
unconditional contributions ($0, $2, $4, $6, $8, and $10). Each token that was placed correctly 
earned the participant $0.50. Denoting a participant’s reported guess of the number of subjects 
who chose unconditional contribution k as    and the actual number of subjects as   , then the 
belief elicitation payoff can be expressed as:
 
 
 
                                           (7) 
 
After completing the belief elicitation task, participants completed a brief survey where 
they indicated their gender and familiarity with the charitable cause.
50
 They were next informed 
                                               
50 There is no evidence of a gender difference in familiarity to the organization (EWB). Nationally, 45% of EWB 
members are women. 
!
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of (1) their earnings from the belief elicitation task, (2) the actual contribution they would 
provide based on whether or not they were the randomly selected member of their group and, if 
so, the unconditional contributions of their group members, and (3) their group’s total 
contribution to the cause. Donations were then collected according to the procedures described 
above. 
4.3.2 Results 
Our experiment is designed to examine how participants position themselves within the 
distribution of group members’ contributions under visibility and not just whether visibility 
increases or decreases giving. Thus, our main analysis in this section centers on examining the 
relationship between participants’ conditional contributions and the (hypothetical) choices of 
their partners. Despite this, it is instructive to first consider simple summary statistics and 
determinants of giving, after which we will turn to more specific hypotheses regarding 
participants’ conditional contribution decisions. In some additional results, we also take 
advantage of the belief elicitation and examine the relationship between unconditional 
contributions and expectations about others’ giving. 
4.3.2.1 Summary statistics and determinants of giving 
 
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics from all phases of the experiment: unconditional 
contributions, conditional contributions, and elicited beliefs.  Recall that in the belief elicitation 
procedure, participants indicate their beliefs about how many of the 14 other participants in their 
session chose an unconditional contribution of $0, how many chose $2, etc. Because their 
responses across the possible contribution levels must add to 14, elicited beliefs can be 
interpreted as a participants’ subjective probability distribution. Thus, we simply divide 
participants’ reports by 14 to obtain participants’ beliefs as probabilities. As a summary measure, 
we use these probabilities to construct each participant’s expected value of others’ unconditional 
contributions. 
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In both the unconditional and conditional phases of the experiment, the raw means of 
contributions are slightly higher under visibility but not significantly so. Similiarly, participants 
expect others to choose slightly (and insignificantly) higher contributions under visibility.  
 
 
Table 4.1. Summary statistics 
 Control Visibility p-value (two-
tailed t-test) 
    
Unconditional contribution 3.333 4.133 0.16 
 (0.408) (0.395)  
Conditional contribution1 3.010 3.641 0.22 
 (0.381) (0.348)  
Belief: E(uncond. cont.) 3.396 3.484 0.79 
 (0.242) (0.219)  
    
Observations 75 75  
Standard errors in parentheses.   
1 Reported standard errors are from the mean of within-subject averages 
of conditional contributions, where there is one observation per participant.  
 
 
Of course, our experiment is designed to test how visibility interacts with social 
information. Thus, we turn to regression analysis in Table 4.2 to assess participants’ reaction to 
social information and, in particular, how the impact of visibility varies with social information.  
In all specifications of Table 4.2, we take “Conditional contribution” as the dependent 
variable and regress this on a dummy for being visible, the mean of group members’ 
(hypothetical) contributions, and – in Columns 2 and 3 – the interaction thereof. Because each 
participant makes 21 conditional contribution decisions, we allow for clustered standard-errors at 
the individual level. 
In Column 1, we simply regress Conditional Contributions on the visibility dummy and 
the group mean. As in the preceding means comparisons, this specification reveals that visibility 
has an insignificantly positive effect on giving. Column 1 also reveals a positive relationship 
between conditional contributions and the mean of group members’ contributions. 
In Column 2, we allow the impact of visibility to vary with social information. Upon 
doing so, we find that the impact of visibility depends on the mean of group members’ 
contributions; as group members’ contributions increase, visibility has an increasingly positive 
effect. More concretely: when the mean of group members’ contributions is zero, visibility has a 
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small, insignificantly negative effect on giving. On the other hand, when the mean of group 
members’ contributions is ten, visibility increases contributions by $1.34 (p-value=0.017)51. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Determinants of conditional contributions (OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Conditional 
contribution 
Conditional 
contribution 
Conditional 
contribution 
    
Vis. 0.631 -0.0803 -0.0803 
 (0.515) (0.554) (0.556) 
Vis. X Group mean  0.142*** 0.142*** 
  (0.0415) (0.0417) 
Group mean 0.0607*** -0.0105  
 (0.0216) (0.0241)  
Constant 2.706*** 3.062*** 3.010*** 
 (0.391) (0.390) (0.381) 
    
Decision FE’s   X 
    
Observations 3,150 3,150 3,150 
R-squared 0.011 0.014 0.015 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual-level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Column 3 include “Decision Fixed Effects” to assess the robustness of these results. 
Participants make 21 decisions; decision fixed effects are simply dummy variables for each of 
these decisions. This specification has the advantage of more flexibly accounting for social 
information. In particular, the Group Mean might be identical across two sets of decision (e.g., 
$0 and $10 versus $4 and $6), but the average response may differ. This would be captured by 
the decision fixed effects. Decision fixed effects prevent us from being able to identify the effect 
of the Group Mean in the Control treatment, but we can still observe the differential impact of 
the Group Mean conditional on being in the Visibility treatment. Results are similar to Column 
2. Decision Fixed Effects are used in later sections of the paper.  
 
In summary: 
 
                                               
51 This prediction is based on the linear combination of Vis+(VisXGroup Mean)X$10. 
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Lab Experiment Finding 1: Visibility does not lead to a general increase in contributions in this 
context. Instead, visibility only has a positive impact when participants expect group members to 
choose a high contribution. 
 
This finding provides some evidence against simple reputation-seeking preferences, from 
which we might have expected a general increase in contributions with visibility. However, the 
positive relationship between social information and contributions documented in Table 4.2 
(when visible) may stem from either wallflower preferences or from matching either of the group 
members’ contributions (conformity). Alternatively, participants may hold more complex 
reputation-seeking preferences: systematically choosing a contribution just above the maximum 
of group members’ contributions would also lead to the documented pattern.  In the next 
subsection, we attempt to disentangle these explanations by more directly examining where 
participants position their contributions relative to group members. 
  
4.3.2.2 Direct evidence of wallflower preferences 
 
Our model suggests that wallflowers are drawn towards the action that would signal that the 
individual taking it is an “average type” relative to their group members. Reputation-seekers are 
drawn towards actions that signal high types. This implies our main test for the presence of 
wallflower preferences: given social information about player j and k’s contributions        , 
where      , visibility increases the probability that participant i chooses “middle” actions 
(  between    and   ) and decreases the probability of extreme actions, that is,    that is larger 
than    .  
We estimate a series of linear probability models assessing the likelihood that for some 
conditional decision a participant chooses a contribution within a particular range relative to her 
group members’ (hypothetical) contributions. The main ranges of interest are: (1) less than the 
minimum (     ), (2) equal to the minimum (     ), (3) within range (        ), (4) 
equal to the maximum (     ), or (5) greater than the maximum (     ). Thus, we estimate 
a set of regressions of the form: 
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where    
    if participant   chooses a contribution within the associated range   in conditional 
decision              . Note that it is not always possible to choose a contribution within a 
particular range. For instance, when the minimum of partners’ contributions is 0, it is impossible 
to choose a contribution “less than the minimum.” These instances are excluded from the 
analysis.
52
  As in Column 3 of Table 4.2, we include    (decision fixed effects), controls for 
beliefs, and familiarity with the cause. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The 
Visibility coefficient is of primary interest. 
Panel A of Table 4.3 reports our main results. Consistent with our prediction, participants 
are significantly more likely to choose a contribution within the range of group members’ 
contributions (Column 3). Visibility also moves subjects away from an extremely low (< Min.) 
contribution (Column 1). Contrary to reputation-seeking preferences, there is no evidence that 
visibility increases the likelihood of choosing a contribution that is high relative to group 
members (Column 5).  
Panel B examines how people adjust to social information more directly and provides an 
opportunity to test our model in a more targeted manner. Because we can identify what an 
individual would choose in the absence of social information (unconditional contribution), we 
can identify the individuals who should be especially likely to move towards the center: the 
individuals whose unconditional contributions were just above ($2 higher than) the maximum of 
group member contributions and individuals whose unconditional contributions were just below 
($2 below) the minimum. In Panel B, we modify the main specification (from Panel A) to allow 
for an interaction between visibility and dummy variables indicating that an individual’s 
unconditional contribution is just below the minimum (“Just below”) or just above the maximum 
                                               
52 Other exclusions: It is impossible to be “greater than maximum” when the maximum contribution is 10, so all 
such cases are excluded from “greater than max.” regression. It is impossible to be strictly “within range” when the 
distance between partners’ contributions is 0 or 2, so these cases are excluded from “within range” regression. 
Finally, there is no unique maximum or minimum when partners’ contributions are identical, so these cases are 
excluded from the “equal to min.” and “equal to max.” regressions. 
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(“Just above”). For brevity, in Panel B we simply report the marginal effects of visibility for each 
of these two groups.
53
 
 
Table 4.3. Likelihood of choosing a contribution within a particular range 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES < Min. = Min. Within range = Max. > Max. 
      
PANEL A: Main specifications 
 
Vis. -0.112* 0.0222 0.0720* 0.0258 -0.00889 
 (0.0577) (0.0233) (0.0419) (0.0248) (0.0510) 
Constant 0.611*** 0.228*** 0.244*** 0.108*** 0.212*** 
 (0.0420) (0.0145) (0.0289) (0.0173) (0.0368) 
      
Observations 2,250 2,250 1,500 2,250 2,250 
R-squared 0.178 0.050 0.141 0.036 0.107 
      
PANEL B: Assessing the impact of visibility on marginal choices 
 
Vis. X Just above 0.0195 0.0367 0.0241 0.194** -0.266** 
 (0.0667) (0.0629) (0.0784) (0.0961) (0.126) 
Vis. X Just below -0.128** 0.125** -0.0309 0.00680 -0.00123 
 (0.0572) (0.0594) (0.0313) (0.00501) (0.0131) 
Constant 0.477*** 0.279*** 0.221*** 0.110*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0318) (0.0414) (0.0250) (0.0333) 
      
Observations 1,500 900 450 900 1,500 
R-squared 0.443 0.109 0.125 0.100 0.242 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual-level. 
Decision Fixed Effects and controls for beliefs and familiarity are included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Having identified the individuals who should be impacted by the interaction of visibility 
and social information, Panel B provides clear evidence of wallflower behavior. Individuals who 
would have otherwise chosen a contribution just below the minimum are (a) significantly less 
likely to stay below the minimum under visibility (Column 1) and (b) significantly more likely to 
move towards the center – choosing a contribution equal to the minimum (Column 2). This is 
consistent with wallflower behavior, but the decreased likelihood of choosing a low contribution 
is also consistent with reputation seeking preferences. A stronger test is provided by examining 
                                               
53 That is, the linear combinations “Vis + Vis X Max+2” and “Vis + Vis X Min-2”. 
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individuals who, without social information, would have chosen a high (> max.) contribution. 
Walllflower types would be less likely to choose a contribution that exceeds the maximum after 
receiving social information. Indeed, Column 4 suggests that this is the case. Participants who 
would have given a high amount respond by decreasing their contribution and towards the 
center. 
Alternatively, we can take individuals as the unit of observation and assess the fraction of 
contributions that a participant places within the range of partners’ contributions.  If wallflower 
preferences are prevalent, the average frequency of “within range” choices should increase with 
visibility. This is the case, as displayed in Panel A of 4.2. (Panels B and C are discussed in the 
next subsection.) The average participant in the visibility treatment places 32% of choices within 
range, while the average control treatment participant places only 24% of choices within range. 
This difference is significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Individual level frequency of "within range" contributions 
 
 
Lab Experiment Finding 2: Consistent with wallflower behavior (but not reputation seeking 
preferences), visibility induces participants to move towards the center of the distribution of 
group members’ contributions. Participants are significantly more likely to choose a contribution 
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strictly within the range of group members. Participants who were just above or just below group 
members’ contributions are especially likely to move towards the center.  
4.3.2.3 Heterogeneity in reputation concerns 
 
The previous section provides evidence of the presence of wallflowers. In this subsection we ask: 
who are they? Is there heterogeneity in reputation concerns? Previous literature suggests two 
possible dimensions where this heterogeneity may be observed: task familiarity and gender. 
Existing work has shown that individuals who have less experience with a charitable cause are 
more likely to respond to social information about it (Shang & Croson, 2009). Moreover, if 
familiarity with the cause enhances intrinsic desire to give, higher familiarity may reduce the 
importance of reputation concerns in determining a donor’s level of giving.  
Research in psychology has suggested that women are more likely than men to conform 
when observed by a group (Eagly, 1978; Eagly & Carli, 1981; Bond & Smith, 1996). Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) review literature from psychology and economics showing that women’s 
behavior shows higher sensitivity to changes in the social environment than men’s.54 It has also 
been shown that females tend to avoid competitive situations altogether when given the choice 
(Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). Additionally, Kanthak and Woon (2012) show that females are 
reluctant to reveal their ability to compete in an election environment. If publication of prosocial 
behavior is perceived as a status competition, it is unsurprising to find that females “opt out” of 
this competition by choosing actions that are least likely to draw attention. The interaction of 
prosocial behavior and competition in altruism signaling can be seen in Pan and Houser (2011) 
laboratory public goods game where participants directly compete to be the “best giver”. The 
authors find that when altruism signaling is possible, males (and not females) respond by 
                                               
54 Zetland and Della Giusta (2011) vary the salience of social information in a public goods game and show that 
only women change their behavior in response to this manipulation.  Others have shown that females are 
significantly less likely to donate blood when a monetary payment is offered, while males are more likely to donate 
(Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008), Lacetera and Macis (2010)). This may be due to females internalizing social 
cues that blood donation should be given out of pure altruism and not for money. There are no observable gender 
differences in crowding out when extrinsic incentives are given in the form of a gift voucher (Lacetera and Macis 
(2010)) or when participants are allowed to donate the cash payment to charity (Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008)). 
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becoming more competitive and, as a result, provide higher contributions. Thus, existing 
literature suggests that women may be more likely than men to display wallflower preferences.  
We test these hypotheses by modifying the main empirical specification from the Table 
4.3 (Panel A) to allow for interactions between visibility and familiarity, and also visibility and 
gender. We also provide some additional evidence on gender differences in the unconditional 
contribution phase. 
Results are presented in Table 4.4. As before, let         represent what person j and k 
hypothetically gave and assume      . We report only the marginal effects of visibility for 
each group (familiar and unfamiliar, male and female).  
 
Table 4.4. Likelihood of choosing a contribution within a particular range - Heterogeneous responses 
 (1) (4) (5) (6) (3) 
VARIABLES < Min. = Min. Within range = Max. > Max. 
      
PANEL A: Differential response to visibility by Familiarity with Cause 
      
Vis. X Familiar -0.134 0.0240 0.0293 0.0572 0.00815 
 (0.0956) (0.0430) (0.0767) (0.0433) (0.0974) 
Vis. X Unfamiliar -0.131* 0.0137 0.100** 0.0191 0.00623 
 (0.0688) (0.0278) (0.0496) (0.0313) (0.0563) 
Constant 0.517*** 0.202*** 0.275*** 0.131*** 0.287*** 
 (0.0681) (0.0221) (0.0480) (0.0219) (0.0630) 
      
Observations 2,250 2,250 1,500 2,250 2,250 
R-squared 0.203 0.052 0.143 0.044 0.131 
      
PANEL B: Differential response to visibility by Gender 
      
Vis. X Male -0.0853 0.0371 -0.0304 0.0364 -0.00574 
 (0.0778) (0.0326) (0.0571) (0.0278) (0.0700) 
Vis. X Female -0.136 0.00835 0.173*** 0.0139 -0.0133 
 (0.0839) (0.0330) (0.0589) (0.0406) (0.0742) 
Constant 0.646*** 0.239*** 0.276*** 0.0789*** 0.188*** 
 (0.0532) (0.0165) (0.0403) (0.0152) (0.0458) 
      
Observations 2,250 2,250 1,500 2,250 2,250 
R-squared 0.188 0.053 0.155 0.041 0.110 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual-level. 
Decision Fixed Effects and controls for beliefs and familiarity are included. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In Panel A, we interact “Vis.” with a dummy variable indicating that the participant is 
unfamiliar with the cause (“Unfamiliar”). We find that individuals who are unfamiliar with the 
cause are less likely to give a low amount (Column 1) and more likely to choose a contribution 
within    and    (Column 3). This is not only consistent with results in the social information 
literature, but also suggests that unfamiliar individuals may be more affected by social 
information because their giving decision is more motivated by reputation concerns than those 
who familiar with the cause.  
In Panel B, we add a control for “Female” and the interaction of Female and Visibility. 
We find that the impact of visibility reported in the previous subsection is almost entirely driven 
by women. Women are significantly more likely to choose a contribution within range when 
visible and (insignificantly) less likely to choose a contribution below the minimum or above the 
maximum of group members’ contributions. While the estimates for men are imprecise and of 
much smaller magnitude, there is some evidence that men are more likely to match either the 
minimum or maximum of group members contributions.  
These patterns can be seen in Panels B and C of Figure 4.2, which reports the average 
fraction of contributions that a participant places “within range” by treatment. Visibility 
significantly increases the fraction of contributions placed within range for women (p-
val.=0.005) and participants unfamiliar with the cause (p-val.=0.049), but not men or individuals 
unfamiliar with the cause. 
 
Lab Experiment Finding 3: Wallflower behavior is particularly prevalent amongst women and 
individuals unfamiliar with the cause. Both groups are significantly more likely to choose 
contributions within the range of group members’ contributions when visible.  
 
Women and individuals unfamiliar with the cause respond to visibility by moving 
towards the mean of group members’ contributions. We now examine whether this heterogeneity 
in reputation concerns can also be detected in the absence of social information. To do so, we 
calculate “belief-normalized contributions”: using elicited beliefs, we calculate each subjects’ 
expectation of other’s average unconditional contribution and subtract this quantity from 
subjects’ unconditional giving. With wallflower preferences, visibility would compress belief-
normalized contributions of wallflower types around 0; on the other hand, it would shift to 
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belief-normalized contributions of reputation seeking types to the right. We find evidence of 
reputation heterogeneity in this context across gender but none across familiarity. Figure 4.3 
illustrates that women’s contributions are increasingly compressed around the center; this 
phenomenon is not true of men. Indeed, variance-ratio tests reveal that the variance of women’s 
(but not men’s) belief-normalized contributions decreases with visibility (one-tailed t-test p-
value=0.061), while the mean of men’s (but not women’s) belief-normalized contributions 
increases (one-tailed t-test p-value=0.071).
55
  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Distributions of "belief normalized contributions" 
 
4.3.3 Summarizing lab results 
In summary, our laboratory experiment provides evidence of wallflower behavior. Visibility 
does not always increase prosocial behavior. Instead, it induces participants to follow what they 
think others will do more closely. This conformity to social information is driven by participants’ 
tendency to move towards “middle” actions when observed, suggesting a desire to minimize 
                                               
55 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the hypothesis that women’s “belief-normalized contributions” across control 
and visibility treatments are drawn from the same distribution (p-val.=0.65). This null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
for men (p-val.=0.475). We conducted similar tests for participants familiar and unfamiliar with the cause, but find 
no important differences. Visibility increases the mean of “belief-normalized” giving for both familiar and 
unfamiliar participants, but does not differentially impact the variance of giving across groups. 
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reputation signals.  This is especially true of women and those who are unfamiliar with the 
nonprofit. There is additional evidence that women respond to visibility differently in the 
unconditional phase of the experiment. Visibility reduces the dispersion of women’s 
contributions around their expectation of others’ giving. Overall it appears that visibility 
amplifies the effect of social information – it lowers giving when others are contributing little 
and increases giving when others are contributing a lot.  
4.4 GENERALIZING WALLFLOWER BEHAVIOR 
In this section, we test the generalizability of the results from our laboratory experiment. We 
report the results of a small-scale fundraising experiment, using gender to identify individuals 
with wallflower preferences. (Information on familiarity with the cause is unavailable in our field 
experiment.) 
We examine whether our findings on wallflower preferences translate to settings outside 
the lab in a small field experiment.  Partnering with Engineers for a Sustainable World (ESW), 
we set up a computer game booth at a campus fair to raise money for a development project.
56
 In 
the game, a 15x15 grid of jumbled letters hides 12 words. For every word found, 15 cents are 
donated to the project. When one word search puzzle is completed, another appears. Fair 
attendees can stop by the booth to play the game for as long as they wish. When participants 
click on a quit button, they are directed to a short demographic survey.  
Participants are randomly assigned to one of two treatments: Scores, or Names.
57
 In the 
Scores treatment, the $ amount raised by previous players is displayed before the game starts.
58
 
In the Names treatment, participants are first asked to enter their name; they are then shown the $ 
                                               
56 The booth had five laptop computers programmed to display the word search game. Partitions are set up 
such that only one person can be at each computer.  
57 A Baseline treatment was also conducted, but is not discussed here. In the Baseline treatment participants simply 
played the wordsearch game without receiving any information about the donations of previous participants and 
without being asked to enter their name. In total we had 104 subjects, 71 in Scores and Names. 20 subjects without 
starting the survey and hence their gender information is not available.  
58 The listing for both Scores and Names includes only the last 10 people on that computer. 
 94 
amount and names of previous players. They are aware that future participants will observe their 
name and donation.  
On average, participants spend 5.5 minutes working and contribute $2.25, which 
corresponds to finding 15 words. A modal contribution emerges: roughly half of all participants 
stop at the end of the first puzzle, finding exactly 12 words and contributing $1.80. Male 
donation went from $2.79 in Scores (N=17) to $2.94 in Names (N=10).  However, female 
donation decreased from $3.15 in Scores (N=12) to $2.08 in Names (N=12).  Figure 4.4 shows 
that the drop in giving is not due to a simple downward shift: when names are displayed, females 
in the Names treatment are significantly more likely to choose the modal contribution of $1.80. 
The same is not true for male.
59
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Freq. of donations below, equal to, and above $1.80 by treatment and gender 
 
                                               
59 Though not displayed here, the significant increase in women’s likelihood of choosing $1.80 in response to the 
names treatment is demonstrated through a probit estimation, which includes computer fixed effects and a control 
for the number of other individuals in the booth at the same time. The marginal impact of the Names treatment on 
women’s likelihood of choosing $1.80 is significant at the 10%.  
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we revisit the question of how visibility impacts prosocial behavior. We 
theoretically propose a novel response to visibility: reputation avoidance, or “wallflower” 
behavior. We suggest that some individuals are averse to standing out in either a negative way 
(appearing selfish) or positive way (“showing off”) when visible. These preferences imply that 
individuals will respond to visibility by avoiding actions that are either very low or very high 
relative to others, thereby pushing individuals’ choices towards the center of the distribution of 
actions (or what they expect to be the center.) 
We provide evidence of such behavior in a laboratory experiment. Participants are able to 
choose a donation to a charitable cause conditional on every possible combination of the 
donations of their two group members, who – in the Visibility treatment – will observe how 
much they donated. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that visibility 
significantly increases the likelihood that participants choose a contribution within the range of 
group members’ contributions, thereby avoiding contributions that could be perceived as very 
high or very low. 
In additional analyses, we find some evidence of heterogeneity in reputation avoidance. 
Individuals who were unfamiliar with the charitable cause in our laboratory experiment are more 
likely to display wallflower behavior. We have stronger evidence on heterogeneity across 
genders. Women in particular consistently respond to visibility by choosing a contribution 
strictly within the range of group members’ contributions. We have less conclusive evidence on 
the behavior of men, but they appear to be more likely to choose a contribution at the boundaries 
of the range of group members’ contributions (either matching the minimum or maximum).  
There are also gender differences in contribution decisions when participants do not know how 
much their partners have given (the unconditional decisions). We observe participants’ beliefs 
about partners’ giving and find that, with visibility, the distribution of women’s contributions is 
more compressed around their expectation of the average level of giving. 
The evidence we find of reputation avoidance may help explain the divergent results in 
the literature. While most of the existing experimental work tests the hypothesis that visibility 
increases giving, we suggest that this may not be the right question to ask. Differences in the 
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impact of visibility in the public goods game and dictator game, for instance, may be explained 
by differences in participants’ beliefs about the average level of giving across the two 
environments. According to the wallflower model, the impact of visibility depends on whether 
individuals perceive the average level of giving as high or low. As a result, visibility may have 
positive, negative, or no impact, depending on the environment.  
We find evidence of this implication in our data. In the conditional contribution 
decisions, visibility only has a positive impact when the mean of partners’ giving is high. We 
also see evidence of this implication in our field experiment, particularly for women. Women’s 
donations decrease because they are drawn to the relatively low modal contribution that emerges.  
These findings are far from being of purely theoretical interest. Outside of the 
experimental laboratory, prosocial behavior is rarely anonymous. Fundraisers often purposefully 
increase the visibility of contributions by publishing donor lists for instance. Other activities – 
such as volunteering or going to a polling location to vote, which are more often than not carried 
out in public and in the presence of peers – are visible by their very nature. Thus, a deeper 
understanding of the impact of such visibility is critical.  
Our findings suggest that care must be taken in manipulating the degree of visibility of 
prosocial behavior. This is particularly true in prosocial environments where females are 
overrepresented, as is the case in the nonprofit sector. Indeed, as Gibelman (2000) demonstrates, 
though females make up a large majority of the nonprofit sector, upper management positions 
continue to be male-dominated. While we certainly do not claim to fully explain this 
phenomenon, our finding that females prefer to avoid drawing attention to themselves when 
prosocial behavior is visible, may play an important role. In the context of charitable giving, 
males and females have different preferences in the charitable causes they support (Andreoni et 
al., 2003). This fact, combined with our results, suggests that causes that attract more female 
givers may require a very different fundraising strategy than those that attract males.  
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APPENDIX 
ADDITIONAL RESULTS FROM CHAPTER 2 
Table A1: Main government outcomes – additional time varying controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Revenue Educ. exp. Non-educ. exp. 
    
Edulot 0.0133 0.00215 0.0143 
 (0.0178) (0.0324) (0.0200) 
Pre-treat trend -0.00120 0.00273 -0.00574** 
(Years before Edulot) (0.00253) (0.00202) (0.00260) 
Post-treat trend 0.00556*** 0.00714 0.00348 
(Years after Edulot) (0.00175) (0.00545) (0.00288) 
Non-educ. lottery -0.00533 -0.0272 0.0202 
 (0.0255) (0.0439) (0.0269) 
Population -0.127 -0.495*** 0.163 
 (0.106) (0.156) (0.178) 
Income 0.941*** 0.738*** 0.510** 
 (0.215) (0.274) (0.213) 
Other revenue  0.203*** 0.224*** 
  (0.0675) (0.0596) 
Total students -0.247** 0.288* -0.326** 
 (0.0927) (0.148) (0.125) 
Unemp. rate 0.00109 -0.0379 0.0488** 
 (0.0336) (0.0333) (0.0240) 
Republican gov. -0.0140* -0.00659 -0.0224** 
 (0.00734) (0.0135) (0.00869) 
Constant 3.417*** 1.106 0.572 
 (1.169) (1.938) (2.466) 
    
Observations 950 950 950 
R-squared 0.963 0.957 0.980 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the state-level) in parentheses. 
All continous controls and outcome variables are in logs. All monetary variables (including 
outcome variables) are measured at the per-capita level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2: Education expenditures in an earlier time period for comparison with existing literature 
 Years: 1989-2008 
(as covered in this paper) 
Years: 1976-2000 
(as covered in Novarro and Evans & 
Zhang) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Educ. exp. Elem. educ. 
exp. 
Higher educ. 
exp. 
Educ. exp. Elem. educ. 
exp. 
Higher educ. 
exp. 
       
Edulot -0.00692 -0.0574 0.0208 0.00811 0.378* 0.0130 
 (0.0314) (0.0578) (0.0355) (0.0298) (0.199) (0.0307) 
       
Obs. 950 950 950 1,250 1,092 1,250 
R-squared 0.952 0.882 0.966 0.978 0.900 0.972 
All specifications include the same controls and fixed effects as those reported in Table 2. 
Education expenditure variables are in logs and measured at per capita level. 
Robust standard errors (clustered at state-level) in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table A3: The impact of an education lottery on contributions received -- Allowing for treatment 
effects 2 years before and after the treatment date 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Contributions received: 
Educ. orgs. 
Contributions received: 
Educ. orgs. 
   
Edulot – 2 years  0.00414 
  (0.0328) 
Edulot -0.0689** -0.0475*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0168) 
Edulot + 2 years  -0.0451 
  (0.0333) 
   
Observations 27,905 27,905 
R-squared 0.155 0.155 
Empirical specifications match those reported in Table 10 (Column 2): IV-fixed effects regressions with 
fixed effects at the nonprofit level. The dependent variable is donations received by education related 
organizations. Column 1 matches the main result reported in Table 10. Column 2 extends this 
specification to allow for differential pre- and post-treatment trends. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Contributions received as a function of education-earmarked lottery proceeds 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Contributions received:  
Educ. orgs. 
Contributions received:  
Non-educ. orgs. 
 
Panel A: Fixed effects regressions 
ln(Edulot proceeds) -0.00632*** 0.000901 
 (0.00204) (0.00206) 
   
Panel B: IV Fixed effects regressions 
ln(Edulot proceeds) -0.00525** 0.00119 
 (0.00216) (0.00307) 
   
Unit of observation: nonprofit firm. Dependent variable: donations received. Empirical specifications 
match those reported in the text either without accounting for fundraising (Panel A) or accounting for 
fundraising through the IV strategy (Panel B). 
Robust standard errors (clustered at state-level) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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